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This dissertation consists on three chapters that study how public policies affects
safety, and their economic consequences. In the first chapter entitled “Unlocking Ameni-
ties: Estimating Public Good Complementarity” we explore the implications of public goods
complementarities for economic valuation and efficient public investment. We focus on the
setting of public safety and open space in inner cities. Research on public goods generally
considers the value of individual public goods in isolation, when in fact there may be strong
complementarities between them. Cross-sectional, difference-in-difference, and instrumental-
variable estimates from Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia all indicate that local crime
lowers the amenity value of public parks to nearby residents. Public safety improvements
“unlock” the value of open-space amenities, and could raise the value that properties re-
ceive from adjacent parks from $10.5 Billion to $18.34 Billion in those three cities. Ignoring
these complementarities risks over-estimating benefits in dangerous areas, under-estimating
benefits in poor areas or conflating reduced amenity value with the preferences of local
populations, and under-estimating benefits overall.
The second chapter, titled “When the One-Armed Bandits Move in Next Door: The
Effects of Access to Gambling on Crime”, examines the effects on crime and property val-
ues following state legislation in Illinois that legalized video gambling. At the same time
the legislation gave municipalities decision-making authority over whether to allow video
gambling terminals within their local boundaries. Many jurisdictions adjacent to Chicago
chose to allow the terminals, while the City of Chicago itself did not, thus creating a natural
experiment with which to compare crime rates between areas closer to and farther from
video gambling establishments. Using detailed incident-level crime data and a difference-in-
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differences strategy, we find that access to gambling increases property and violent crimes;
that these crimes represent “new” rather than displaced incidents; and that the effects are
persistent over time.
The last chapter, “Do More Eyes on the Street Reduce Crime? Evidence from Chicago’s
Safe Passage Program” focuses on the effects on safety and attendance of this program.
Chicago’s Safe Passage program attempts to ensure the safety of student traveling to and
from schools by placing civilian guards along specified routes. The program was launched
during the 2009-2010 school year and was expanded to 140 schools by 2015-16. We use
data from more than 10 years of geocoded Chicago police reports and school level data to
analyze the Safe Passage program’s effects on crime rates and the rate of absenteeism from
schools. Our findings suggest that the program is an efficient and cost effective alternative
way of policing with direct effects on crime and student’s outcomes. Exploiting both spatial
and temporal variation in the implementation of the program, we find that the presence of
guards results in lower levels of crime, with violent crime declining by 14% on average. The
rate of absenteeism is estimated to decline by 2.5 percentage points. We find no evidence of
spillovers of crime to areas that are not along the Safe Passage routes.
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Economic theory leans heavily on the concept that goods may be complements in consump-
tion. While the joint demand of private goods has been studied extensively, little has been
said on the joint demand for public goods. Studying the joint demand for public goods
is difficult since they cannot be purchased directly in markets, but only indirectly, such as
through the housing market.2 To our knowledge, no prior study has priced relationships be-
tween public goods in a well-identified causal framework. This present problems for optimal
public investment decisions, since as we show below, the value of public goods may depend
critically on complementary relationships.
In this chapter, we study the complementary relationship between public safety and park
access in three major U.S. cities. Our point of departure is intuitive: parks are not valued
1This chapter is based with joint work with David Albouy and Peter Christensen
2 The closest analyses we know of consider the relationship between amenities and private consumption:
Connolly (2008) and Graff Zivin and Neidell (2014) examine the relationship between weather and time use,
and thus leisure as a good; Cuffe (2017) examines how rainfall influences museum attendance.
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by nearby residents when they are dangerous. In fact, locals may even view dangerous
parks as a public bad, and want to live away from them. The urban planning literature
has indeed postulated that parks can provide amenity or disamenity value depending on
how they interact with other factors (Weiss et al., 2011), albeit without assigning specific
values. We find strong evidence that, while greater safety is always valued, open space may
be highly valued, but only once a threshold level of safety is reached. The net value of open
space can be negative below this threshold, implying that increases in public safety increase
or “unlock” the value of open spaces. A corollary is that residents value safety more near
open spaces. Indeed, crime reductions in cities particularly near predetermined public goods
such as urban parks, may be boons to urban revival.3
To demonstrate the importance of public-good complementarity, we examine the implica-
tions when complementary interactions are ignored. Estimators that ignore such interactions
find a lower value of open space. Models of residents with heterogeneous preferences would
suggest that residents who locate in high-crime neighborhoods simply do not put value on
open space. Furthermore, as high-crime areas tend to have low income, estimators interacted
with income produce the result that open space is a luxury good that only high-income house-
holds value. However, once the fact that poor neighborhoods tend to be unsafe is accounted
for, parks have the same percentage impact on housing prices in low income neighborhoods
as in high-income ones. Rather, public safety may be considered a more “primary” public
good than open space, but when safety is abundant, the value households put on open space
does not depend on their income. Public investments in environmental amenities, such as
3 See Baum-Snow and Hartley (2017) and Couture and Handbury (2017).
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open space, which ignore these facts risk being wasted in unsafe areas, or overly targeted
towards high-income areas.
This chapter combines two parallel, but mostly disparate, strands of research on hedonic
valuation. The first involves estimating the value of public spending, starting with Oates
(1969), and then Thaler (1978) and Gibbons (2004), who examine the magnitude of capi-
talization effects and the channels through which it operates. More recent studies address
measurement error and omitted variables concerns to estimate the value of general policing
(Chalfin and McCrary, 2017a, Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004); targeted public safety and
crime prevention programs (Donohue et al., 2013, Draca et al., 2011); and the relocation of
sex offenders (Linden and Rockoff, 2008a).
A virtually independent literature estimates the value of increases (Gamper-Rabindran
and Timmins, 2013) and reductions (Currie et al., 2015, Davis, 2004, Muehlenbachs et al.,
2015) in environmental amenities. Many authors estimate the value of access to open space —
see Brander and Koetse (2011) for a meta-analysis — though omitted variables concerns have
limited the reliability of estimates of the demand for access to parks. The limited available
evidence from revealed-preference studies provides countervailing evidence regarding the sign
of the interaction between crime and open space value, which could result from bias due to
time-varying unobservables or sampling issues that limit external validity (Anderson and
West, 2006, Troy and Grove, 2008). There is some empirical evidence that suggests that
crime can affect property values near rail stations, another urban public good (Bowes and
Ihlanfeldt, 2001). To our knowledge, however, this is the first analysis to formalize the study
of public goods complementarity and the first to focus explicitly on the joint provision of
3
public safety and environmental amenities.
Our empirical analysis is based on crime and housing data in Chicago, New York and
Philadelphia from 2001 to 2016. In particular, we use 529,606 housing market transactions
within a tight radius (3/8 (0.375) miles) around 1,339 parks, which we organize into park
neighborhoods. Using data from individual police reports, we match all reported crime
incidents to these 1,339 neighborhoods, focusing on homicides. We calculate changes in crime
risk at the level of these focused neighborhoods as well as within neighborhoods using the
density of crime incidents to measure location-specific changes in crime risk. Microeconomic
research on the value of open space has increasingly relied upon fixed effects research designs
to control for unobserved neighborhood characteristics that might affect the estimated value
of parks (Espey et al., 2001, Anderson and West, 2006). Our results confirm the importance
of controlling for local unobservables and also indicate that controlling for neighborhood
effects while omitting the key interaction between crime and parks can bias the estimate
of park value to zero. Using estimates from fixed-effects and difference-in-difference (DD)
models with variation within each neighborhood as the source of identifying variation, we
show how the price premium associated with park proximity falls substantially with crime
risk. Moreover, while the park premium is substantial in neighborhoods with little crime, it
appears to be negative in the highest crime areas, suggesting that parks in these areas are
a public bad. Reinforcing the idea that our results are truly driven by parks, we find that
larger parks command a higher premium, which is more severely reduced by crime.
An advantage of our methodology is that while open space is largely predetermined,
crime changes over time in ways that are rather uncorrelated with the presence of parks.
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Nevertheless, given potential endogeneity problems with local crime rates, we develop a
shift-share instrumental variables (IV) approach that makes use of widespread city-level
crime reductions that occurred across these cities in the early 2000’s (2001-2016) to test our
hypotheses. This approach uses city-level changes in crime, combined with local heterogenity
in crime rates in a base period, to predict future crime in every neighborhood. This isolates
local changes in crime that are independent of purely local causes. Thus, the shift-share
is also a useful instrument for changes in crime rates not interacted with parks. Indeed,
IV estimates not only substantiate our hypotheses on amenity complementarities, but also
provide credible estimates on the value of crime reduction, as well as higher park premium.
Our key IV estimates indicate that parks contribute $10.5 Billion in total (annualized)
value to nearby homeowners in the three cities. This value is comparable to the present value
of all resources spent on park activities and maintenance. If completely unlocked through
safety improvements this value would rise to $18.3 Billion. Since the beginning of our sample
period, reductions in crime have already unlocked almost a $2.8 Billion in value.
Our findings also suggest that simply displacing crime from one area to another can
improve welfare. Concentrating criminal activity away from parks through targeted invest-
ments in public safety or crime-inhibiting park design may unlock considerable value, even
if would create more value to eliminate it altogether.4 There is an active discussion among
urban deigners and planners regarding the best approaches for reducing crime in and around
parks. While our data on parks are not sufficiently detailed to evaluate the value of design
choices, our results suggest that the benefits from effective strategies could be considerable
4This displacement potentially be achieved in a distributionally neutral fashion, i.e. without helping the
rich at the expense of the poor.
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– perhaps larger than is currently understood in analyses that do not consider or properly
evaluate the complementarity that we identify in this chapter.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents a theory of complementary public
goods in a hedonic setting and reveals how a sufficiently low level of one amenity can lock
in the value of its complement. Section 1.3 describes the data that are used in our valuation
of public safety and open space. In Section 1.4, we present evidence from cross-sectional,
difference-in-difference, and IV estimates of the relationship between public safety and open
space amenities. Section 1.5 discusses the implications of this evidence for the valuation and
public provision of complementary public goods. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Public Good Complements “Unlocked”
In principle, complementary preferences between public goods, e.g., warm weather and a
community pool, are no less important than between private goods, swimming trunks and
goggles. Public and private goods may also be complementary, swimming trunks and a pool.
Complementary amenities are actually implied by the canonical Tinbergen model, adapted
here from Bartik and Smith (1987) and Ekeland et al. (2004), even though they have only
rarely been explored. It even allows for “unlocking” effects, as we show below. This model
characterizes a hedonic setting with two amenities q1, q2, and a numeraire good, x. There
are also two corresponding taste parameters, χ1, χ2.
U (q1, q2, x;χ1, χ2) subject to p (q1, q2) + x = m
We identify amenity 1 as outdoor open space, and amenity 2 as safety.
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1.2.1 Utility Specification and Marginal Willingness to Pay




(q1 − χ1)2 θ11 +
1
2
(q2 − χ2)2 θ22 + (q1 − χ1) (q2 − χ2) θ12
Where θ11θ12 > (θ12)
2, and χ1 and χ2 are (high-valued) bliss points, so that in all relevant
ranges, χ1 > q1, and χ2 > q2. The marginal willingness to pay of an individual is given by
∂U
∂q1
= (q1 − χ1) θ11 + (q2 − χ2) θ12
∂U
∂q2
= (q2 − χ2) θ22 + (q1 − χ1) θ12
The case we consider is where θ11 , θ22 < 0, which ensures that, discounting the interaction
effect, both amenities are good. We explore the conditions under which the interaction “locks
in” the value of amenity 1. In particular, we allow for a negative interaction where θ12 > 0,
which creates the “locking” effect. It is clear to see that the marginal willingness to pay for
amenity 1 will be negative when:
(χ1 − q1) (−θ11) < (χ2 − q2) θ12
If safety is very low , q2 << χ2, and the amenity effect here is negative, especially when θ11
is not much larger than θ12. If the direct demand for safety, θ22 is sufficiently large, then the
condition that safety is a good is easily satisfied
(χ2 − q2) (−θ22) > (χ1 − q1) θ12
even when θ12 is non-zero.
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1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We combine data on housing market transactions, crimes, and neighborhood characteristics
for Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia. Our choice of cities is determined by the availabil-
ity and length of incident-level crime data. For the city of Chicago, our data set contains the
years 2001-2016; for New York, 2006-2016; for Philadelphia, 2006-2016. Housing transaction
prices and structural characteristics come from Zillow. Each house is matched with data
on the demographic composition of residents living in the Census Tract coming from the
2011-15 American Community Survey. In addition, we use block and block group level data
from the Census and American Community Survey on demographics and housing units for
benefit calculations and socio-demographic changes below.
Parks are defined from our source (openstreenmap.org) as: “open, green area for recre-
ation, usually municipal, and are differentiated from other public/private open spaces such
as: golf courses, stadiums, nature reserves (which may not have public access), and mari-
nas”.5 The data contain the precise timing and location of all housing transactions recorded
within 3/8 (0.375) miles of 1,339 geo-coded urban parks in the three cities. 90 percent of
the parks are in Chicago and New York. For concreteness, we refer to the 3/8 miles radius
around a park as a park’s “neighborhood”. Our final data comprises 529,606 housing trans-
actions surrounding parks. Figure 1.1 presents a sample of the data on housing transactions
near Marquette Park in Chicago.
Our safety measure is based on crime reports. The crime report data comes from police
departments in each city, provided by the Open Data Portal, which provides the geolocation
5See https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Key:leisure
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of each report.6 We use geolocated reports to calculate crime density maps for each city and
year. Prior research that examines the relationship between crime and housing values sug-
gests that certain types of crime such as property crime may act as proxies for neighborhoods
amenities and wealth in addition to measuring crime risk. For clarity and comparability, we
focus our primary analysis on homicide risk, though results from exercises based on the full
set of crime risk are reported in the appendix.7 We use crime and homicides interchangably
to refer to personal safety risk throughout the chapter.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the estimated homicide density for Chicago in 2003. Darker-shaded
areas indicate higher likelihood of a homicide. To estimate the density we use information
on homicides for the previous three years and a bivariate Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth
of 2/8 of a mile on a 1/8 mile city grid. By using a three year rolling window we smooth out
any short term fluctuations in homicides at a particular location, and the narrow bandwidth
on the fine grid chosen allows us to better captures the likelihood at a given location. We
then combine the estimated likelihood at a given location with the total number of homicides
in the city (Ht) to obtain the following measure of homicide risk:
6For the City of Chicago the data are extracted from the Chicago Police Department’s CLEAR (Citizen
Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting) system and available through the Chicago Data Portal at https:
//goo.gl/D8Vm82 New York City data from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and available
through NYC Open Data portal at https://goo.gl/zGp8Z2. Philadelphia crime incidents come from the
Philadelphia Police Department and are available through Open Data Philly at https://goo.gl/gYR96r
7Prior research illustrates substantial heterogeneity in the perception and valuation of different types
of crime and ambiguous effects of property crimes on housing prices, for example Thaler (1978) finds that
property crimes reduce housing prices but Gibbons (2004) finds no effect of burglaries. Ihlanfeldt and Mayock
(2010) point to the drawback of using total crimes as a crime risk measure. Using total crime gives implicitly
the same weight to all crimes, and introduces significant measurement error. We utilize willingness-to-pay
estimates from Chalfin and McCrary (2017a) to construct a unitary measure of homicide-equivalents. We
find that homicide risk dominates the index and that our results reported in Tables A.3 and A.4 are robust to
this measure. Results are attenuated as a consequence of the introduction of measurement error. However,
this it is mitigated by our homicide-equivalence measure.
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HomicideRisk = E(Hlt) = pltHt (1.1)
where plt is the estimated probability of homicide at location l in year t. Homicide risk is
defined as the expected number of homicides (E(Hlt) = H
e
lt) per square mile in year t at
location l.
In order to estimate how prices vary with crime risk, we use the geolocation of each
dwelling to match each transaction to the estimated homicide risk per square mile at that
location.8 Figure 1.3 shows the ratio of the homicide risk near a park (within 1/8 of a mile)
with respect to the rest of the neighborhood (beyond 1/8 but within 3/8 of a mile). On
average the crime density near parks is higher in more dangerous neighborhoods relative
to the overall neighborhood. We find substantial variation in the level of homicide activity
surrounding parks in relatively safe neighbourhoods, though it appears to be lower on aver-
age than in more dangerous neighborhoods. This descriptive result suggests an important
relationship between public safety and park access in the most dangerous neighborhoods in
our sample.
Figure 1.4 plots the trends in homicides for each of the cities in our sample during the
study period. All of the three metropolitan areas have experienced substantial (>30%)
declines in city-wide homicide rates during the study period (with the exception of Chicago
in 2016). However, declines within cities were not uniform, with some locations experiencing
decreases, increases or no changes in homicide risk. Figures 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 map changes in
8In the appendix in table A.2 we also use annual neighborhood crime rates, which are the number of
crimes occurring within each park neighborhood. We show that our results are consistent to using these
neighborhood crime rates, which capture the overall safety of an area rather than simply what occurs in a
given point.
10
the geography of crime risk surrounding parks in the three cities. We classify parks in three
groups, those in neighborhoods that have experienced a Decrease, Increase or No Change
in homicide risk. If the park neighborhood experienced a median change of less than .1
expected homicides per year per mi2 during the study period, we classify them as having
experienced no change in homicide risk. About 29% of the neighborhoods in the sample
have experienced a decrease, 34% no change, and 37% an increase in homicide risk.9
1.4 Identifying Public Good Complements
We consider a sequence of three estimators to obtain the value of the park-safety complemen-
tarity, with each one exploiting a different source of variation to identify the effect. We begin
by solely focusing on cross-sectional variation in homicide-risk across neighborhoods using a
model that compares the value of parks between high-crime and low-crime areas. As with
the prior literature (Espey et al., 2001, Anderson and West, 2006), these estimates control
for time-invariant unobservables using neighborhood fixed effects and identify a park’s value
using variation in distance between each transacted home and the associated park. The
second and third strategies exploit the spatial and temporal variation of crime within neigh-
borhoods. The second develops a difference-in-difference strategy that uses homes further
from parks as controls for homes immediately surrounding parks; the third uses an instru-
mental variable strategy based on shifts in the share of homicide risk across neighborhoods
as each of the cities experience large declines (and the occasional surge) in homicide rates at
9We subdivide some of the largest parks, such as Central Park in New York, Lincoln Park in Chicago and
Fairmount Park in Philladelphia, in order to capture the effects of crime in particular neighborhoods that
they span.
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the city-level. We then provide additional evidence on the park-safety complementarity by
considering heterogeneity in the value of large versus small parks.
1.4.1 How Park Premia Vary by Safety Level in the Cross Section
We begin by considering the cross-sectional “park premium” using a simple linear model to
compare low and high-crime neighborhoods. It estimates price variation using 1/16 (0.0625)
mile-wide indicators for the distance from a house to its neighborhood park. As depicted in
Figure 1.1, each 1/16 mile interval corresponds to roughly one block in many neighborhoods
in our sample. Therefore, the first 1/16 interval can be thought of as a transaction that was
likely to occur within the view/earshot of the park, the second interval can be thought of
as a short walk away, and so on. This approach allows us to delineate the price gradient
generated from proximity to parks. The distance bins are then interacted with homicide
risk in the neighborhood. The cross-sectional model for P jcit , the sales price of house i in













(1/16) × k ≤ djil < (1/16) × (k + 1)
]
×Hej (1.2)
+ βDi + γj + δ
c
t + uit
where djil is the distance between each house i in location l to the closest neighborhood
park. Hej is homicide risk measured by the expected number of homicides per year per square
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mile over the sample period in neighborhood j.10 Di is a vector of (potentially time-varying)
dwelling characteristics and census tract demographic controls.11 γj is a neighborhood fixed
effect that controls for unobservables that affect prices across neighborhoods in the sample.
δct a fixed effect for city by transaction year to control for city-specific price trends. uit is an
error term.
In neighborhoods with zero homicide risk, the estimated park premium for bin k is given




k . The hypothesis that safe
and accessible open spaces are goods is represented by the prediction that π0k > 0 and that
π0k ≥ πk+1 for k ≤ k′. There exists some threshold k′, which is the point at which park
access no longer matters. The hypothesis that safety and open space are complements is
illustrated by: πEHk < 0 for k ≤ k′. The hypothesis that the amenity values of open spaces
can be locked-in is defined by the existence of some Hj, such that Hj > −πEk /πEHk .
Table 1.2 reports estimates from Model 1.2, which documents changes in the park pre-
mium at the 5 different distance intervals defined above. The reference category in this
specification is the most distant interval, such that the interpretation of the premium for
proximity is interpreted relative to transaction prices in this outermost band (0.3125 - 0.375
miles). Column 1 reports estimates from a specification that does not account for the inter-
action between park access and homicide risk, whereas columns 2-4 do specify an interaction
10We estimate homicide risk as described in eq. 1.1 but considering the entire sample period. That is
densities are estimated using all years and combined with the total number of homicides experienced in the
city on those years. Since we have different sample lengths for the three cities we normalize everything as
an yearly average.
11Dwelling characteristics include: age of the dwelling and it’s square, number of bedrooms and an indicator
for dwelling type (i.e. Single Family Residence, Condo, etc.). Census tract controls include: log Distance
centroid of park to the CBD, and census tract demographic variables from the 2011-15 ACS: median income,
% males between 15 and 35, % of hispanics, % of blacks, median age, average household size, % of vacant
units, and number of housing units.
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term in a set of variant specifications that use different controls for neighborhood-level un-
observables: (2) neighborhood fixed effects, (3) neighborhood fixed effects plus tract fixed
controls to account for heterogeneity in census tracts that are associated with the same
park, and (4) neighborhood fixed effects plus tract fixed effects. The estimates presented
in all models suggest a large premium within the first interval of distance from a park that
disappears altogether outside .0625 miles.12
Figure 1.8 presents the results in graphical form, using fitted estimates of the park pre-
mium based on estimates from Model 1.2 and fitted values for 0 and 5 expected homicides
per year per square mile.13 The graph illustrates a 4.2% premium for locations within 1/16
miles of a park in low homicide risk neighborhoods (with zero homicides). However, in
high-homicide risk neighborhoods (with an expected homicides per year of 5 or more per
square mile), there is instead a park discount of 2.5%. Both the park premium and discounts
dissipate beyond 1/8 (0.125) miles from the neighborhood park.
These estimates are suggestive of a substantial park premium in safe neighborhoods
that shifts to negative in dangerous areas. A comparison of the estimates between Column
(1) and Column (3) also indicates that failure to account for the complementarity between
crime and park access results in substantial downward bias (nearly 50%) in the estimated
park premium – the estimated park premium within 1/16 of a mile is 4.2% in a model that
12Point estimates in this specification decline rapily and are not statistically significant after the first
interval, which offer a close approximation to properties within the first block of a park. However, we note
the overall pattern of declining price effects and that the relatively small bandwidth used in this specification
(which offer a close approximation to neighborhood blocks) likely affects the precision in the estimates at
each interval of distance in this model. For comparison, Bayer et al. (2007) uses bins of 0.1 and 0.2 miles
13About 8% of neighborhood in our sample have no expected homicides in the sample, and 13% of the
neighborhood have 5 or more expected homicides per year per square mile, among the most dangerous are
are Ogden Park in Chicago’s south side, Garfield Park in Chicago’s west side, Jackie Robinson Park in the
Bronx (NY), Lincoln Terrace Park in Brooklyn (NY), and Malcolm X Park in Philadelphia.
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captures the complementarity versus 2.4% in the same model that omits it.14 This cross-
sectional evidence is of course limited, however, since unobserved dwelling and neighborhood
characteristics (including homicide risk) may be strongly correlated with park proximity.
Figure 1.3 suggests that homicide risk surrounding parks in this sample is somewhat higher in
high crime neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the results provide an important point of departure
for considering how park premia change with neighborhood-wide levels in safety.
1.4.2 How Park Premia Change with Crime over Time
The next step is to exploit the time variation in crime levels. Using the steep decay function
revealed above, we develop a difference-in-difference (DD) estimation procedure, based on a
simplified “treatment-control” framework. We divide housing within 1/8 miles of a neigh-
borhood park — subject to a park “treatment” – from housing 1/8 and 3/8 miles away from
the park park – the control.
We begin with a standard difference-in-difference identifying assumption. Conditional
on our controls, factors that affect neighborhood housing price trends and are correlated
with safety will not differentially affect houses that are less than 1/8 miles away relative to
those that are between 1/8 - 3/8 miles from parks. The control homes constitute 286,485
transactions. This yields the following within-neighborhood difference-in-difference equation:














×Helt + βDi + γj + δct + uit (1.3)
This equation differs from 1.2 in that it relies on time variation in homicide risk that
14Note that bias arising from the omission of the complementarity is distinct from omitted variable bias –
both models control for the effect of homicide risk in isolation.
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, as simply “Park” to reflect park proximity. In this design, then,
the higher concentration of homicide risk around parks in high crime neighborhoods will be






Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.3 reports estimates from model 1.3. Consistent with
the results presented in 1.2, the difference-in-differences estimates indicate that without
accounting of the interaction between parks and safety one may conclude there is no urban
park premium. However, once the interaction is accounted for, homes in close proximity
to an urban park sell at a premium (πE > 0) of 2.5 to 2.7 percentage points relative to
homes further away from the the same park.15 More importantly, the results in table 1.3
imply that the value of park proximity declines with crime risk, πEH < 0. An increase in
homicide risk reduces the value of homes within 1/8 miles of a park by .8 - 1.1 percentage
points relative to a home within 3/8 miles of the same park. With high enough homicide
risk, Hjit > −πE/πEH ≈ 2.66(0.095), the park premium becomes negative.
1.4.3 Instrumenting Crime Changes with City-Level Shifts
The estimates provided in Table 1.3 are identified using variation in reductions (or increases)
in crime risk over time, suggesting that reductions in crime risk within a neighborhood are
associated with changes in the park premium. The interpretation of these estimates as the
causal effect of reductions in crime risk on the amenity value of parks still involves a some-
what restrictive set of assumptions. A threat to our identification is the possibility that the
15These estimates are smaller than the 4.2% estimate reported in 1.2, though the treated group in this
model includes the transactions within 1/8 miles of a park rather than 1/16 miles. The directly comparable
estimates are: 2.6 for Model 1.2 and 2.5-2.7 for Model 1.3
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increases in the amenity value of parks are not coming from the effect of reductions in local
crime, but rather from time-varying unobservables that are correlated with local crime reduc-
tions but differentially affect housing prices immediately surrounding parks. This identifica-
tion assumption is not directly testable. A second threat comes directly from measurement
error.16
Another strategy for estimating the complementarity between safety an open space is
to use an instrumental variable for local crime in Equation 1.3. In order to estimate this
relationship consistently, a valid instrumental variable for local crime is needed. We consider
a shift-share instrumental variable strategy, similar to those developed by Bradbury et al.
(1982) and Bartik (1991) for other variables, and examined by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al.
(2017). The shift-share instrument makes use of the fact that reductions in crime around
any given location can be decomposed into overall reductions in crime at the city level and
changes in the geographic distribution of crime. The evidence that motivates the shift-share
instrument in this empirical setting comes directly from Figure 1.4 – much of the variation in
crime risk for any given transaction in our sample can be attributed to substantial declines
in aggregate homicide rates in these cities during our study period.
We construct a relative crime index that makes use of exogenous variation in crime inci-
dence at the city level, but can be used to predict changes in crime at any given location. The
shift-share instrument proportionally assigns homicides in a city according to the estimated
density using the first two years of the sample as a base period.17 Denoting the total annual
16These estimates also rely upon the functional form that we have defined for the amenity value of parks
as a function of distance. Fortunately, that is supported by evidence from estimates from Model 1.2.
17We use homicide data for 2001-2002 for Chicago, and 2006-2007 for NY and Philadelphia as our base
period.
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homicides in a city in year t as Ht, the probability of a homicide in location l in year t is plt.
Using a base time period, normalized to t = 0, the predicted expected number of homicides
at each location i is
H ivlt = pl0Ht (1.4)
Locations with a higher risk of homicides at the beginning of the period will have similar
levels of predicted crimes in subsequent years, with location-level reductions occurring in
proportion to the city as a whole. The idea is that local crime changes induced by city level
changes are orthogonal to local neighborhood dynamics that might favor a park area over
another. Furthermore, since urban parks are pre-determined geographically, another valid





Consistent with the trends illustrated in Figure 1.4, the first stage results of the IV
regression in table 1.4 indicate that city-level reductions in homicide risk are a strong pre-
dictor of location-level homicide risk. Our estimates indicate that 1 homicide increase in the
shift-share instrument predicts a 0.52 increase in homicide risk.
Table 1.5 reports estimates from our preferred IV specification alongside comparable
DD estimates.1819 A priori one may expect that results will be less negative if the IV
eliminated any endogenous homicide reductions, however results will be larger if the variation
in homicide risk did not follow city trends as a result of measurement error. The IV estimates
suggest a stronger negative direct effect of homicides on property values, πH < 0, suggesting
18DD estimates in this model are constrained to the period and sample that we use for the IV. Since
we use the first two years of the sample to estimate our instrument we discard those from our estimation,
constraining our data for the years 2003-2016 for Chicago, 2008-2016 for New York and Philadelphia. This
results in our sample being reduced from 529,606 to 430,453 observation
19As a robustness check, we drop 2016 to isolate the spike in homicides in Chicago in that year. Results
reported in table A.6 remain unchanged
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that the relative incidence of measurement error is larger than the endogeneity bias.20 21
Our results show. An increase in homicide risk by 1, reduces housing values by 2.8 percent
in the uninteracted model that omits the complementarity, and 2.5 percent in the interacted
model that identifies it. Consistent with results from all prior models, there is no evidence
of a premium for park access in specifications that omit the complementarity.
Moreover, the estimate of the interaction between park and homicide risk becomes more
negative in the IV specification, with πEH ≈ 1.1%. In words, reductions in crime in the
neighborhood have a larger and more significant effect (p < 0.01). The safe park premium
also rises in this specification to πE ≈ 2.4%. As a result, the homicide level at which park
value is unlocked is slightly lower at −πE/πEH ≈ 2.11(0.63).
1.4.4 Magnitudes and Park Size
It seems almost obvious that a larger park is a greater amenity than a smaller one. Finding
that larger parks increase housing prices more than smaller ones not only supports this idea,
but also the auxiliary hypothesis that our proposed methodology indeed identifies the effect
of parks. Indeed, if there is more value to lose, larger parks should lose greater value if they
are seen as dangerous.
To test these ideas, we define a large park as above the 90th percentile in area, which
has a minimum size of 0.39mi2 (∼ 250 acres). Table 1.6, which presents results for the
both the uninteracted and interacted model, indicates that there is a much higher base
20See Pope and Pope (2012) and Card (2001) for a nice discussion of the endogeneity-measurement error
trade off.
21In table A.5 we add a Park*Neighborhood FE as a further check, results for Homicide Risk remain
robust
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premium for living by a large park than by a small park. Furthermore, the interacted
model shows a greater effect homicide risk on large parks than on small parks. Nevertheless,
we do find a negative, if commensurately smaller, estimate for small parks. This finding
lends greater confidence in our interpretation that the park premium associated with cross-
sectional variation in park location is indeed due to parks, and that the interacted model
produces sensible, well-identified results.
1.5 Complementarities and Public Goods Provision
The estimates in the prior section indicate that the complementarity between publicly pro-
vided goods has first-order implications for the valuation of public goods and ultimately
for public policy decisions. In this section, we examine the implications of these results for
the valuation and provision of environmental amenities and for complementary public goods
more broadly.
1.5.1 Implications of Complementarities for Valuation and Un-
locking Value
Our IV estimates suggest that the amenity value of open space in the average neighborhood
in our sample of 3 major cities in the United States is large, with a park premium in the
average neighborhood in our sample of 2.4 percentage points. To calculate the implied value
of parks in our sample, we compute the number of housing units and median property value
at the census block group level from the 2000 census.22 Using the number of units, the
22We calculate the area of the block group that is within 1/8 miles of a park to compute the proportion
of housing units in each census block group affected by the premium.
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median property value, and our estimates from table 1.5 column (5), we estimate the value
of parks for each city.
Table 1.7 shows the estimated park values, which total $10.5 Billion. Parks in Chicago
are valued at around $3.5 Billion; in New York, $6.5 B; Philadelphia, $0.4 Billion. While
the value of urban parks is large overall, our estimates also indicate that the local amenity
benefits from parks are dominated by disamenity from crime risk. As defined above, our
estimates indicate an average park premium of 2.4% that falls by 1.1 percentage points per
increase in annual homicide risk. An actual reduction in homicide density should result in a
2.5 percentage point increase in the price of a house away from a park, and 3.6 percentage
points by a park. On the other hand, simply displacing crime away from neighborhoods
with parks should still in principle increase values city-wide, possibly by 1.1% of value of
housing within 1/8 of a mile near parks. Spillover effects for those further from the parks
might make this number even higher.
Estimates from Table 1.7 illustrate that the majority of the value of neighborhood parks
in our sample of cities is concentrated in neighborhoods with at low homicide risk (less than
one expected homicide by year). However, our estimates in Panel (b) indicate that the most
of the amenity value in neighborhoods at medium homicide rates (between one and three
expected homicides per year) is locked in by crime risk: this value sums to $3.5 Billion: $1.1
Billion in Chicago, $2.3 Billion in New York, and $179 Million in Philadelphia. Again, this
could be achieved ostensibly by displacing crime from zones immediately surrounding parks,
rather than eliminating it altogether.
The estimates in Panel (c) reveal that accounting for the complementarity between public
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safety and park amenities can dramatically affect how we assess the value of parks. Both
IV and DD estimates that ignore the interaction of crime and parks (Table 1.5, columns 1
and 4) imply a much lower park premium of 2.4%. This mis-specified model produces an
estimate of $3.5 Billion for the parks in our sample, underestimating the total value in our
sample by 66%.
Table 1.8 reports estimates of changes in neighborhood park value that have already
resulted from reductions or increases in annual homicide risk during the study period. These
estimates indicate that reductions in homicide rates have unlocked considerable amenity
value in certain neighborhoods: $2.5 Billion in Chicago, by $5.9 Billion in New York, and $101
Million in Philadelphia. Increases in homicide rates in other neighborhoods have resulted in
simultaneous reductions in the amenity value of parks, totaling $5.7 Billion during the study
period: $2.1 Billion in Chicago, $3 Billion in New York, and $575 Million in Philadelphia.
These results indicate that attention to public goods complementaries can be important for
understanding the distributional implications of programs that are designed to affect one,
perhaps with little regard for the other.
1.5.2 Implications for Public Goods Provision
A second key implication of this research concerns the cost-effectiveness of investments in
public goods that are affected by “lock-in”. When leisure-producing environmental amenities
are locked in by high levels of crime risk, it is likely that the marginal benefit of investments
made to improve their quality (without addressing crime risk) will be limited. While we do
not have adequate data to fully determine the marginal cost of parks in this analysis, it is
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still possible to shed some light on optimal public expenditures. For instance, there may be
an argument that Chicago, with its large stock of parks, has potentially much to gain from
security improvements.
Our estimates imply that fully accounting for complementarity effects parks are valued
at $3.5 Billion; $6.5 Billion, and $467 Million, in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia, re-
spectively. At the same time, park maintenance and programs, the City of Chicago annually
spends $323 Million on parks; New York spends $342 Million, and Philadelphia, $54 Million.
This does not reflect the full cost of parks, since it ignores the opportunity cost of the land
for alternative development.
The numbers above imply that, the value of park proximity alone would be enough to fund
cash expenditures on parks, possibly through a land tax on properties within 1/8 miles. On
the other hand, the naive estimators would provide just over half as much potential revenue
for covering park expenses. These valuations should be considered a lower bound as they
clearly ignore all of the benefits and spillovers parks provide to residents more than 1/8 miles
away, but which are too diffuse as to produce an identifiable park premium in housing prices.
The numbers also imply that residents near parks would pay a premium to remove or
displace crime from their neighborhoods, in proportion to the value added. It must be noted
that this could be the value of simply displacing crime to zones where crime risk does not
interact with the parks (ie. outside a 1/8 mile from a park), though this strategy would be
problematic if it failed to account for interactions between crime risk and other public goods.
We further note that careful attention must be paid to the overall needs and concerns of
neighborhoods that may be adversely affected by crime displacement. If the IV estimates on
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crime reduction from the main effect are taken seriously, eliminating crime would likely pro-
duce much larger increases in value. Whether that could be accomplished through policing,
or through other means, more efficiently, remains an open question.
1.5.3 Disentangling Complementarities from Taste and Income
Heterogeneity
A caution that emerges from these findings is that models that examine the value of en-
vironmental amenities may confound the effect of complementarities with heterogeneity in
preferences or income effects. Indeed, estimates of revealed preference for parks that derive
from a model that does not account public safety complementarities will create the appear-
ance that residents in high crime neighborhoods place a lower value on their neighborhood
parks.
A more coherent explanation than exogenous taste differences is to try to model dif-
ferences in income. High and low-income individuals may have similar tastes, but value
different goods on the margin because of their purchasing power. Indeed, many authors, e.g.
Black (1999), that many amenities are luxuries, implying that consumption goods purchased
from markets directly are necessities. The results presented in Table 1.9 explore the possi-
bility that environmental amenities are a luxury by splitting effects according to the median
income of the neighborhood. Neighborhoods whose median income is below the 25th per-
centile are deemed low income. The results from the uninteracted regression in columns (1)
and (3) both suggest no park premium in low-income neighborhoods. Both the DD and IV
results demonstrate that accounting for this interaction boosts the premium for low income
neighborhoods.
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The conflation bias illustrated by the comparison in Table 1.9 has important implica-
tions for considering the distributional effects of expenditures that are justified on the basis
of hedonic estimates or any mental model of a policy maker who fails to consider the com-
plementary nature of public safety and a leisure-producing environmental amenity. To the
extent that public expenditures that are used to create, manage or improve environmental
amenities such as urban parks are rationalized on the basis of their assumed or estimated,
failure to understand this complementary relationship result in a tendency invest dispropor-
tionately in environmental public goods in higher income neighborhoods/populations.
Since prices in this model are expressed in logarithms and houses tend to be much cheaper
in low-income areas, the premium paid in dollars to be near a park will still be lower.
However, with a conventional utility function such as Cobb-Douglas, a similar coefficient in
the semi-log form would support that parks are a neutral good, and thus neither a luxury
nor a necessity. This finding is rather intuitive, since low-income households should value
the largely free benefits that most parks confer to nearby residents.
1.6 Conclusion
This study demonstrates the importance of complementarity in public goods, beginning with
the basic insight that accounting for such these interactions can have important implications
for how we understand preferences and allocate public expenditures. We provide concrete
evidence by focusing on the empirical relationship between public safety and city parks,
which is a particularly compelling setting where the level of provision for one public good
(public safety) can determine not only the magnitude but even the valence of its complement.
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Indeed, we find that parks in insecure neighborhoods can be a public bad for local residents.
This finding is important for policy makers and environmental justice advocates who might
conclude from incomplete evidence that more public investments to disadvantaged commu-
nities are always highly desirable for their redistributive effects. The conclusion suggested
by our results is that in these communities, a deficit in public safety has locked-in the value
of leisure-producing environmental amenities. In particular, we find that homes in neighbor-
hoods with safe public parks sell at a premium of 2.5 - 2.7 percent, but that the amenity
value of parks declines and then becomes negative at high enough homicide rates. In our
sample, the value of parks is becomes fully locked-in at 2.7 predicted homicides per year.
We show that a naive model of value for city parks that might be identified using exoge-
nous variation but fail to account for the public safety complementarity will assign a zero
value to the full sample of parks in our sample. Such a model would also suggest that parks
are valued far less in low income neighborhoods. In a more complete model, we show that
safe open spaces appear to be valued equally in both low and high-income communities in
the same sample. Policy-makers, economists, and urban planners who ignore complementar-
ities might falsely conclude that environmental amenities low-income residents get very little
value from their neighborhood parks. Economists who are modeling preference heterogeneity
might assume that residents’ preferences for environmental amenities are lower in less secure
areas, possibly rationalizing it through an under-explained sorting behavior.
Finally, our quantitative estimates imply that the overall public value of open space may
be underestimated through naive estimators. Furthermore, the potential value of existing
open spaces may be much greater when they are unlocked. Our estimates indicate that
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(1) public safety improvements (including displacement efforts) in zones near existing parks
in these three cities alone has the potential to unlock $7.8 Billion of amenity value and
(2) this represents a large share of the total amenity value ($10.5 Billion) conferred by the
parks. Equally important is the observation that this relationship cuts both ways: spikes
in violent crime or its redistribution to zones near parks, as observed in Chicago in 2016,
can lock amenity value in. Public safety is therefore a first-order concern in considering the
value of leisure-producing environmental amenities such as open space. This is of particular
importance to cities that have a considerable historical endowment of open spaces relative
to their population, such as Chicago. Past improvements in safety have improved welfare
considerably in unlocking green spaces, and further improvements could have even larger
effects.
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1.7 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Chicago New York Philadelphia Sample
Number of Parks 571 647 121 1,339
Average park size (in mi2) 0.024 0.047 0.097 0.042
Average neighborhood size (in mi2) 0.641 0.737 0.915 0.712
Expected homicides within 3/8mi. 1.638 1.456 1.368 1.262
No. Properties sold within 1/8mi. 139,400 93,176 10,545 243,121
No. Properties sold between 1/8 mi. and 3/8mi. 165,994 104,044 16,447 286,485
Av. log price within 1/8mi. 12.44 13.479 12.402 12.836
Av. log price between 1/8 mi. and 3/8mi. 12.372 13.306 12.194 12.701
Notes: Sample includes transactions of Single-Family Residence and Condos within 3/8 mi. of a park. for Chicago (2001-
2016), New York (2006-2016), and Philadelphia (2006-2015) from Zillow. We refer to the 3/8 miles radius around a park
as a park’s “neighborhood”
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Table 1.2: Park Premium and Homicide Risk in the Cross Section
Dependent variable:
ln Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Within 1/16mi. of a Park 0.024∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016)
Within 2/16mi. of a Park 0.007 0.024 0.018 0.018
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013)
Within 3/16mi. of a Park 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.007
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Within 4/16mi. of a Park −0.008 −0.008 −0.010 −0.004
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Within 5/16mi. of a Park −0.006 −0.0002 −0.005 −0.015
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
Within 1/16 mi. * Homicide Risk −0.014∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Within 2/16mi. * Homicide Risk −0.010∗∗ −0.008∗ −0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Within 3/16mi. * Homicide Risk 0.0002 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Within 4/16mi. * Homicide Risk −0.0004 0.001 0.0003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Within 5/16mi. * Homicide Risk −0.001 −0.0003 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes No Yes No
Tract FE No No No Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 529,606 529,606 529,606 529,606
Notes: Sample includes transactions within 3/8 mi. of a park for Chicago (2001-2016), New York (2006-
2016), and Philadelphia (2006-2016) from Zillow. Dependent variable is log of sales price. Within 1/16
mi. (0.0625) of Park is an indicator that takes one if the property is within 1/16 miles of a park.
Within 2/16 miles of Park is an indicator that takes one if the property is between 1/16 miles and
2/16 miles of a park. Similar of the other variables. Our base are properties between 5/16 mi. and
6/16mi. of a Park. Homicide Risk denotes the expected average number of homicides per squared mile
in the neighborhood over the sample period. Standard errors clustered at the census tract level are in
parenthesis.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.3: Park Premium and Homicide Risk: Difference in Differences
Dependent variable:
ln Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Park 0.009 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Homicide Risk −0.019∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Park*Homicide Risk −0.011∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes No Yes No
Tract FE No No No Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 529,606 529,606 529,606 529,606
Notes: Sample includes transactions within 3/8 mi. of a park for Chicago (2001-2016), New
York (2006-2016), and Philadelphia (2006-2016) from Zillow. Dependent variable is log of
sales price, Park is an indicator for sales within 1/8 mi. of a park, Homicides Risk denotes
number of expected homicides per squared mile. All regression include controls for dwelling
characteristics, neighborhood and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the census
tract level are in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
30




Pred. Homicide Risk 0.518∗∗∗
(0.013)
Property Char. Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Test of excluded Instruments
F-statistic 1,703.88
P-value < 0
Week IV (Sanderson and Windmeijer, 2015)
F-statistic 89.678
Observations 430,453
Notes: The sample is the same as in Table 1.5. Homicide Risk per squared mile
is instrumented using predicted Homicide Risk per squared mile based on the
initial densities (first two years) and the total annual homicides at city level. All
regression include controls for dwelling characteristics, census tract demographic
controls, neighborhood and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
census tract level are in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.5: Park Premium and Homicide Risk:
Difference in Differences and Shift-Share Instrument
Dependent variable:
ln Price
DD DD IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Park 0.009 0.020∗∗ 0.008 0.024∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Homicide Risk −0.019∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Park*Homicide Risk −0.007∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 430,453 430,453 430,453 430,453
Notes: Sample is the same as in Table 1.3 without the first two years of the sample for each
city, i.e. Chicago (2003-2016), New York (2008-2016), and Philadelphia (2008-2016). We use
the first two years to build the likelihood of homicides at each location. Dependent variable
is log of sales price, Park is an indicator for sales within 1/8 miles of the park, Homicide
Risk denotes number of expected homicides per squared mile. Homicide Risk at a location is
instrumented using predicted expected homicides in that location based on the initial homicide
density and the total annual homicides at city level. Standard errors clustered at the census
tract level are in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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DD DD IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Large Park 0.088∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.039) (0.034) (0.040)
Small Park 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Large Park * Homicide Risk −0.031∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.019)
Small Park* Homicide Risk −0.004∗ −0.007∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Homicide Risk −0.015∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 430,453 430,453 430,453 430,453
Notes: Sample is the same as in Table 1.5, i.e. Chicago (2003-2016), New York (2008-2016), and
Philadelphia (2008-2016). Large/Small Park denotes a dummy that takes one if the area of the
park is above/below the 90th percentile. Standard errors clustered at the census tract level are in
parenthesis.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.7: Amenity Value of Parks
(in mill)
Homicide Risk
Low Medium High Total
Panel (a): Amenity Value
Chicago 1, 745 1, 343 492 3, 580
NY 2, 896 2, 898 672 6, 466
Philly 170 256 42 467
Total 4, 811 4, 497 1, 206 10, 514
Panel (b): Amenity Value locked in by Homicide Risk
Chicago 330 1, 096 1, 138 2, 564
NY 725 2, 323 1, 901 4, 948
Philly 39 179 100 317
Total 1, 093 3, 598 3, 139 7, 830
Panel (c): Naive Amenity Value
Chicago 591 455 167 1, 212
NY 981 981 228 2, 190
Philly 57 87 14 158
Total 1, 629 1, 523 408 3, 560
Note: We use the number of units within 1/8 miles of a park, the me-
dian value and our estimates from table 1.5 column (5), to estimate the
amenity value of parks for each city. We calculate the expected number of
homicides in a neighborhood by year and classify them into Low Homicide
Risk: less than one expected homicide by year, Medium Homicide Risk:
more than one and less than three expected homicides per year, and High
Homicide Risk, more than three expected homicides per year.
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Table 1.8: Effect of Crime Reductions on
Amenity Value of Parks (in mill)
Change in Homicide Risk
Decrease No Change Increase Net
Panel (a): Amenity Value
Chicago 896 1, 838 846 3, 580
NY 2, 604 2, 131 1, 459 6, 194
Philly 46 173 248 467
Total 3, 546 4, 142 2, 553 10, 242
Panel (b): Amenity Value locked/unlocked in by Change in Homicide Risk
Chicago 2, 582 - -2, 152 431
NY 5, 904 - -3, 015 2, 888
Philly 101 - -575 -474
Total 8, 587 - -5, 742 2, 845
Note: The amenity value are obtained in the same fashion as in table 1.7. Based on the expected
number of neighborhood homicides we calculate yearly trend using median regression. If the park
neighborhood experienced a median decrease of .1 expected homicides per year per mi2 in the study
period we classify them as having experienced a decrease in homicide risk, by the same token, we say
they Increased their homicide risk if they experienced a median increase of .1 in expected homicides
per year per mi2 in their neighborhood in the study period, and No Change otherwise.
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DD DD IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Park*High Income 0.015 0.022∗∗ 0.014 0.025∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Park*Low Income −0.006 0.014 −0.009 0.025∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015)
Homicide Risk −0.019∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Park*Homicide Risk −0.007∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Low Income −0.020 −0.025∗ −0.017 −0.025∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 430,453 430,453 430,453 430,453
Notes: Sample is the same as in Table 1.5, i.e. Chicago (2003-2016), New York
(2008-2016), and Philadelphia (2008-2016). High and Low Income are indicator
for whether the census track is above/below the 25th percentile of the sample
census tract median income.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Note: Dots represents transactions within 3/8 miles of Chicago’s Marquette park in our sample. Different shades denote
proximity to the park.
37
v








Note: Shades represent a density estimation of being a homicide victim per square mile. Estimates are based geolocated crime
data for years 2001-2003 using a bivariate Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 2/8 of a mile on a 1/8 mile city grid.
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Figure 1.3: Homicide Risk near Parks
Note: The vertical axis denotes the ratio of average homicide risk per square mile in the sample period of the areas near a
park (within 1/8mi), over those in the the rest of the neighborhood (2-3/8 of a mile). The horizontal axis measures the
average yearly homicide risk in the neighborhood (within 3/8 of a mile)
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(c) Philadelphia. 2006 = 1 (320 homicides)
Note: Number of homicides per year and cities normalized with respect to the first year of the sample
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Figure 1.5: Homicide Risk Change by Neighborhood, Chicago




Note: We classify neighborhoods surrounding the depicted parks in three groups, those that have experienced a Decrease,
Increase or No Change in their homicide risk. If the park neighborhood experienced a median decrease of .1 expected
homicides per year per mi2 in the study period we classify them as having experienced a decrease in homicide risk, by the
same token, we say they Increased their homicide risk if they experienced a median increase of .1 in expected homicides per
year per mi2 in their neighborhood in the study period, and No Change otherwise.
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Figure 1.6: Homicide Risk Change by Neighborhood, New York




Note: We classify neighborhoods surrounding the depicted parks in three groups, those that have experienced a Decrease,
Increase or No Change in their homicide risk. If the park neighborhood experienced a median decrease of .1 expected
homicides per year per mi2 in the study period we classify them as having experienced a decrease in homicide risk, by the
same token, we say they Increased their homicide risk if they experienced a median increase of .1 in expected homicides per
year per mi2 in their neighborhood in the study period, and No Change otherwise.
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Figure 1.7: Homicide Risk Change by Neighborhood, Philadelphia




Note: We classify neighborhoods surrounding the depicted parks in three groups, those that have experienced a Decrease,
Increase or No Change in their homicide risk. If the park neighborhood experienced a median decrease of .1 expected
homicides per year per mi2 in the study period we classify them as having experienced a decrease in homicide risk, by the
same token, we say they Increased their homicide risk if they experienced a median increase of .1 in expected homicides per
year per mi2 in their neighborhood in the study period, and No Change otherwise.
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Figure 1.8: Conditional Park Premium
Note: Park premium conditional on Homicide Risk based on Table 1.2. Low Homicide Risk denotes neighborhoods with no
homicides risk in the sample period, High Homicide Risk neighborhoods with an expected average of 5 yearly homicides per
square mile in the sample period.
44
Chapter 2
When the One-Armed Bandits Move
in Next Door: The Effects of Access
to Gambling on Crime
1
2.1 Introduction
Commercial and tribal gambling expanded rapidly during the early nineties in the United
States, becoming legal in forty states. More recently, many State governments have been or
are considering moving towards decentralizing gambling activity, moving it away from casinos
to local establishments such as bars and restaurants through video gambling.2 After Illinois
made this shift in 2012, the state quickly became the largest video gambling jurisdiction in
the United States, with over 5,000 establishments adopting it by 2016. In Illinois, people
wagered over $14 billion in 2016, which generated over $277 million in tax revenue (equivalent
to around 1 percent of total state tax revenue). Encouraged by the apparent fiscal success
of video gambling in Illinois, other states are considering similar legislation. For example,
1This chapter is based with joint work with Nicolás Bottan and Andrés Ham.
2This form of gambling is often referred to as “convenience gambling”. Video gambling terminals or
video lottery terminals are machines where a player bets on the outcome of a video game (i.e., slots, poker,
roulette, etc.). In 2017, this type of gambling was legal in Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
South Dakota and West Virginia.
45
Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives passed a bill closely resembling to that in Illinois
(House Bill No. 271).3 Moving towards decentralized gambling changes the nature of access
to gambling: instead of being available at a few designated locations (i.e., casinos), it can
become widely available across the state – increasing access drastically.
However, the potential effects on crime from such a large increase in access to gambling
are not well understood. Most of the existing evidence focuses on the effect of casino expan-
sions on crime. This research typically uses county-level variation in casino openings across
the United States or in Native American tribal areas, finding that casino construction in-
creases crime in the same county (Gazel et al., 2001, Evans and Topoleski, 2002, Grinols and
Mustard, 2006, Reece, 2010) and generates some spillovers into neighboring areas (Barthe
and Stitt, 2007, Nichols and Tosun, 2017). However, we must be cautious when extrapolating
these results to the context of decentralized gambling. Casino construction entails changes
other than access to gambling itself. For example, a new casino may generate a positive
local labor market shock that may attenuate the potential negative effects on crime. At the
same time, casinos may attract more people to the area, increasing the likelihood of crimes
occurring. Thus, the introduction of casino gambling offers a less-than-ideal case in which to
study the effect of gambling on crime because location decisions depend on various factors
including local, social, and economic conditions, which may not always be observed by the
econometrician.
An ideal setting to study the effects of increasing access to gambling on crime would
involve randomly placing gambling terminals in some locations and not in others. In this
3Additionally, several other states are considering similar legislation: Indiana (House Bill No. 1262),
Missouri (House Bill No. 990).
46
setting, we could unequivocally examine the effect of access to gambling on crime by com-
paring how crime changes in areas that are closer to gambling terminals relative to those
that are farther away. We take advantage of a setting that closely resembles the ideal ex-
perimental situation in which to analyze the effects of access to gambling: the legalization
and expansion of video gambling in Illinois. The Video Gaming Act of Illinois was passed in
2009 and implemented in 2012. The law allows local establishments in possession of a liquor
license (mainly bars and restaurants) to install up to five video gambling terminals. Local
municipalities can decide whether or not to allow video gambling in their territory. The City
of Chicago has maintained a ban on gambling since 1993. However, several municipalities
directly adjacent to Chicago have adopted video gambling, thus greatly increasing access to
gambling in some areas of Chicago.
In this chapter, we first study how access to gambling affects crime by combining two
data sources: data on establishments that adopted video gambling in the areas neighboring
Chicago, and monthly incident-level data on crime from Chicago. We use a difference-
in-differences strategy that incorporates the timing of the introduction of video gambling
and compares crime in census block groups of Chicago that are closer to video gambling
establishments with those that are farther away. Our identification strategy relies on the
fact that the decision to allow gambling was made independently from the areas of study
in Chicago. Therefore, in absence of the Video Gaming Act, crime in areas relatively closer
to establishments that ever adopted video gambling should have evolved similarly to areas
further away. We test this assumption and find that indeed crime was evolving similarly in
areas closer and farther away from video gambling establishments before it was legalized.
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We find that increasing access to video gambling leads to an increase in property and
violent crimes in Chicago. On average, being near at least one video gambling establishment
is associated with a 6.7 percent increase in property crime, and a 7.5 percent increase in vio-
lent crime. These estimates account for potential confounders, including access to riverboat
casinos, community-area specific trends, and demographic controls. Our findings suggest
that since the time video gambling was adopted in September 2012 until the last month in
our data (July 2016), video gambling created around 4,100 and 1,450 additional property
and violent crimes in Chicago.
Our results suggest that video gambling is creating new crimes rather than displacing
existing ones. The effects of access to video gambling are strongest in the block groups
closest to video gambling establishments. The effects decrease in distance, becoming and
remaining at zero farther away. Additionally, we show that video gambling also led to an
increase in domestic crimes, a type of crime that should not be subject to displacement.
One concern is that video gambling could have increased the availability of bars. There is
evidence suggesting that increasing access to bars can increase crime (Rossow and Norstrom,
2012, Anderson et al., 2017). If this were happening, our estimates could simply be capturing
the effect of more bars rather than access to gambling. Using data on all liquor licenses
granted in Illinois, we show that the effects of access to video gambling remain unchanged
after accounting for changes in access to bars over time.
We find that these effects are mostly driven by property-type crimes; within violent crime
the effects are mostly driven by robbery, a violent form of property crime. Our findings are
most consistent with the mechanism being driven by the direct effects of gambling such
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as problem and pathological gambling (i.e., financial distress), and from increased payoff to
crime (i.e., victims carrying more cash for gambling or from winnings) (Grinols and Mustard,
2006).
Back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest that in the four years since video gambling was
legalized in Illinois, the increase in crime costs Chicago residents approximately $55.5 million,
which is orders of magnitude larger than the estimated transfers of State gambling tax
revenue to the city. We also examine the cost/benefit for legalizing video gambling within
Chicago. Making optimistic assumptions regarding the potential tax revenue, we cannot
conclude that the potential tax revenue would be larger than the increased social costs in
crime.
This research is related to several strands of literature. It relates to research examining
the relationship between gambling and crime. Most of this literature has focused on examin-
ing the effect of casino expansions on crime, finding mixed results overall (Gazel et al., 2001,
Wilson, 2001, Reece, 2010, Hyclak, 2011, Nichols and Tosun, 2017, Falls and Thompson,
2014, Humphreys and Soebbing, 2014). This is partly due to the fact that casino construc-
tions entail large changes in the affected area. For example, several studies have documented
positive effects on the local labor market (Evans and Topoleski, 2002, Humphreys and Marc-
hand, 2013). However, Grinols and Mustard (2006) have the most comprehensive study
where they find that casinos increase crime. We contribute to this literature in three ways.
First, by focusing on a context where factors other than access to gambling remain mostly
unchanged. Second, we study localized effects of access to gambling on crime, rather than
aggregate effects at the county-year level. Third, we exploit a natural experiment where
49
access to gambling was determined by cities outside of Chicago.
We also contribute to a literature examining effects of the expansion of “sin tax” activities
on crime. Recent studies have focused on the effects of legalized prostitution (Ciacci and
Sviatschi, 2016), marijuana dispensaries (Chang and Jacobson, 2017), and bars (Rossow
and Norstrom, 2012). We contribute to this literature by studying the localized effects of
decentralized gambling through the rapid expansion of video gambling terminals – an activity
that looks set to grow in several states over the next years.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background on gambling in Illinois,
showing how access to gambling increased dramatically as a result of the Video Gaming Act.
Section 2.4 describes our data. Section 2.5 presents our identification strategy, Section 2.6
describes our results, and Section 2.7 examines the robustness of our main results. Section 2.8
provides a brief discussion on the costs and benefits of legalizing video gambling in Chicago.
Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Video Gambling in Illinois
Gambling is not new to Illinois. Riverboat casinos were legalized in 1990 through the River-
boat Gambling Act (230 ILCS 10). This made Illinois the second state (after Iowa) to legalize
this form of gambling (Grinols, 2004). Gambling activities have been closely regulated in
Illinois, which has allowed only 10 casinos to open throughout the State. In 2012, river-
boat casinos generated about $350 million in tax revenue for the state and $83 million for
municipalities (Illinois Gaming Board, 2016).
New spending initiatives have begun to rely on funds from gambling revenue to cover
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costs. The 2009 Illinois Jobs Now! project was conceived to foster economic activity, invest
in infrastructure, and create new jobs in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. This
project’s cost was estimated to be $31 billion, of which the state would account for $13
billion or roughly 40%.4 Twenty-year bonds financed by fee and tax increases (e.g., increases
in vehicle registration fees and alcohol/candy taxes) would mainly cover Illinois’ share. The
second largest revenue source would be tax income from video gambling.
In 2009, the State passed the Video Gaming Act (230 ILCS 40) that legalized video
gambling in any retail location with a valid liquor license and not owned by a horse racing
firm or riverboat casino.5 Qualifying establishments fill out an online application and must
pay a $100 annual license fee. If their request is approved, state-licensed technicians can
install between one and five video gambling terminals in the establishment.6 Terminals
cannot directly dispense coins, cash, or tokens. Players instead receive vouchers that can
be exchanged for cash at the register. A player can wager $2 at most and terminals cannot
dispense more than $500 per game played. The total revenue generated by video gambling
terminals is divided in three parts: 70% goes to establishments and terminal companies, 25%
to the state, and 5% to the municipality.
Once implementation of the Video Gaming Act began in September of 2012, adoption
was fast. Figure 2.1 plots the number of video gambling establishments over time. Many
eligible businesses applied for licenses and typically installed the maximum number of ter-
4Remaining funds were to be drawn from state debt and federal and local matching grants.
5Other establishments also qualified for video gambling: licensed fraternal establishments, licensed veteran
organizations, and licensed truck stops.
6Video gambling activities are extensively regulated by the State. Manufacturers, distributors, suppliers,
operators, and handlers must fulfill a number of requirements, pay fees, and are subject to inspections.
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minals allowed by the law. Almost 25,000 video gambling terminals in about 5,000 estab-
lishments were operational by 2016 (Illinois Gaming Board, 2017). This places Illinois as
the largest video gambling jurisdiction in the world, surpassing Nevada. Video gambling
became widespread and convenient to such an extent that revenues and attendance at river-
boat casinos in Illinois have been in decline since video gambling was adopted (Commission
on Government Forecasting and Accountability, 2015).
While the Video Gaming Act legalized video gambling across Illinois, each municipality
could choose whether to allow video gambling within its administrative limits, if it did not
already have an ordinance prohibiting gambling.7 Out of 1,475 municipalities, around 12%
either opted-out or already had an ordinance that outlawed gambling. The most notable
municipality that does not allow video gambling is Chicago. The City of Chicago has had
an ordinance prohibiting gambling that dates back to 1993, passed by City Aldermen in
opposition to Mayor Daley’s plans to bring casinos to the city (ordinance Title 8, Chapter
8-12). An amendment to this ordinance was proposed in 2012 to allow video gambling
(O2012-2236), it was finally voted down in May 2015.
Even though Chicago has not adopted video gambling, access to gambling has increased
dramatically in the city as a result of the Video Gaming Act, notwithstanding that there were
a number of riverboat casinos and land-based casinos in neighboring Indiana. This is driven
by many bordering municipalities that do allow video gambling. We plot the minimum travel
time from the centroid of each census block group to the nearest casino (Figure 2.2.a) or video
gambling establishment (Figure 2.2.b). On average, access to gambling increased by over
7The regulations for the referendum may be found in Section 70 of the Video Gaming Act. They require
asking constituents: “Shall video gambling be prohibited in [municipality]?” The choices are Yes or No.
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47% across the city (or 9 minutes). Given existing evidence suggesting that the relationship
between gambling and travel time approximates an exponential function (Grinols, 2004), we
would expect such a large expansion of access to increase gambling significantly.
In order to identify the causal effect of higher access to gambling on crime, we exploit the
increase in access to video gambling over time and space, taking advantage of detailed data
on crime in Chicago that is unavailable for the rest of Illinois. It is important to note that
there are two main potential sources of attenuation bias. First, we are examine a context
where gambling was already accessible, though it became dramatically more accessible and
widespread with video gambling. Second, the existence of illegal gambling locations within
the city of Chicago may also attenuate any potential effects of access to video gambling. For
these reasons, our estimates in the following sections should be considered lower bounds of
the effects of access to gambling on crime.
2.3 Gambling and Crime
There are several potential mechanisms mediating the relationship between access to gam-
bling and crime. Previous research suggest that individuals exposed to gambling, especially
to electronic gambling machines, may become problem or pathological gamblers (Wheeler
et al., 2011). Pathological gamblers are more likely to engage in criminal activities as a result
of financial and/or emotional distress. In this sense, gamblers have been linked to engage
in property crimes (Blaszczynski and McConaghy, 1994), and domestic violence (Dowling
et al., 2016, Lorenz and Shuttlesworth, 1983, Bland et al., 1993). Research has also shown
that pathological gamblers display other dysfunctional patterns of behavior such as excessive
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drinking and drug use which may also contribute to their criminal behavior(Walker, 2013).8
The link between increases access to gambling and crime can be also explained by the
standard Becker (1968) model. The increase of availability of gambling places increases
the payoff of crime. These places lower the costs of finding potential victims who would
be carrying extra cash to gamble (or from their winnings), increasing the payoffs to crime
Grinols and Mustard (2006).
By studying the expansion of video gambling in a decentralized manner, we can largely
minimize the role played by other mechanisms. Large scale developments, such as casinos,
have been shown to increasing employment, wages, and may spur economic development the
area (Evans and Topoleski, 2002, Humphreys and Marchand, 2013). In our context, these
effects are mostly minimized because the expansion occurs in existing bars and restaurants,
rather than in new developments.9
2.4 Data
We combine data from two main sources. First, incident-level data on crime from police
reports between January 2006 and June 2016 available from the City of Chicago Data Portal.
Similar data is not available for cities neighboring Chicago. This information comes from
the Chicago Police Department’s Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting system.
The data set provides the date, time, and location of the crime at the block-level. Each
incident is also classified according to the Illinois Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) code,
8See Kindt and Palchak (2002) for a discussion on the financial and social costs of pathological gamblers.
9We find that the Video Gambling Act did not significantly affect the availability of bars and restaurants.
See Appendix B.2 for details.
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which in turn follows the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting
guidelines.10 We classify incidents into property and violent crimes. In the case of multiple
offenses, the incident is classified using the FBI’s UCR Hierarchy Rule.11 This hierarchical
classification implies that reports for lower categories will be downward biased.12
We aggregate the data and construct a monthly panel of census block groups because it
is small enough to provide sufficient geographic variation in access. Additionally, we obtain
socio-demographic characteristics at this level to use as controls from the 2000 Census and the
2011-2015 American Community Survey. The demographic data include total population,
population density, median age, average household size, percentage of males aged between
15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, number of housing units, percentage of vacant
housing, and percentage of owners. We extrapolate these measures linearly over time and
include them as controls to account for any changes in socio-demographic characteristics.
Second, monthly data on establishments with video gambling from the Illinois Gaming
Board. The data contains the address of the establishment, as well as information on the
number of video gambling terminals installed, statistics on volume played, and taxes col-
lected. We geo-coded the location of each establishment and use it to construct our main
measure of access to video gambling. We match establishments at the census block group
10Violent crimes include: homicide, sexual assault, robbery and, aggravated assault and battery; while
property crimes: arson, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft. See http://gis.chicagopolice.org/
clearmap_crime_sums/crime_types.html for definitions and descriptions (last access August 17, 2017).
11This rule assigns the highest hierarchy to violent crimes followed by property crimes. It requires that in
a multiple offense scenario the incident must be classified with the highest hierarchy.
12The data only contains incidents for which the police responded and completed a case report. The geo-
location is approximate and accurate only at the block level. It also contains some missing geo-coordinates.
If the address of the incident is present but not the geo-coordinates, we geo-code them to the middle of the
block because the last two digits of the address are withheld. We dropped 401 (0.6%) incidents that could
not be geo-coded.
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level and classify block groups each month inside of Chicago based on proximity to video
gambling using geographic adjacency (e.g., within 1 block is directly adjacent, within 2 blocks
is adjacent-to-adjacent, and so on).
To maximize power, our main specification will define the main independent variable
as the block group being within 3 blocks of a video gambling establishment. However, our
estimates are robust to using alternative definitions of access to gambling, including the
number of establishments within 3 blocks, and access measures typically used in the trade
literature (Harris, 1954, Hanson, 2005) that employ a weighted average of the linear distance
(or traveling times) from the block group centroid to each establishment.13
2.5 Identification Strategy
To identify the effects of increasing access to video gambling on crime in Chicago, we exploit
variation in the expansion of video gambling by establishments over time, and the fact that
some census block groups had greater access than others. Our identification strategy rests
on the assumption that closer places have greater access and are more likely to be affected.
Figure 2.3 illustrates our identification. Using this spatial proximity strategy helps account
for confounding unobserved neighborhood attributes (Linden and Rockoff, 2008b, Diamond
and McQuade, 2016). For this reason, we restrict the sample to census block groups that
are within 6 blocks at any point in time. This restriction does not play an important role in
our results, since they remain robust when including all census block groups in the City of
13For example, if di,j is the linear distance (or traveling time) between block group centroid i and estab-
lishment j, and 1(V Gj,t = 1) indicates that establishment j has video gambling in period t, then gambling
access (GA) is calculated as GAi,t =
∑J




We employ a difference-in-differences strategy that compares crime in block groups that
have greater access to video gambling establishments with blocks that have lower access,
before and after establishments near the Chicago border adopted video gambling. Our
baseline specification for a given outcome Crimei,t (i.e., number of crimes in block group i
in month-year t) is:
Crimei,t = αi + β Within 3 blocksi,t + f(Riverboatsi,t) + tγn + φXi,t + δt + εi,t (2.1)
where Within 3 blocksi,t is an indicator that equals one if the block group is within 3 blocks
of a video gambling establishment at time t and zero otherwise. αi are block group fixed
effects, δt are month-year fixed effects, and εi,t is the error term. Our parameter of interest,
β, estimates the average difference in crime between blocks that are within 3 blocks of
establishments with video gambling relative to those that are further away (4-6 blocks). Our
main identifying assumption is that in absence of video gambling, crime would have evolved
similarly in areas that eventually had high access compared to those with low access. In
Section 2.7 we provide evidence suggesting that this assumption is likely to hold.
This strategy accounts for a number of potential threats to identification. First, there
are a number of riverboat casinos in the greater-Chicago area. During our period of analysis
two new riverboat casinos opened, which could potentially bias our results. To account for
these potential confounding effects we include f(Riverboats), a quadratic function of the
linear distance to the nearest riverboat casino. Second, there could have been unobserved
14See Appendix Table B.1.
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public policies during our period of analysis that could affect crime. For example, if shocks
in crime at the neighborhood-level were correlated with the adoption of video gambling, our
estimates would be biased. We account for this potential threat by including tγn, community
area-specific time trends. Finally, changes in crime could be driven by underlying changes
in the socio-economic conditions of block groups with higher access to gambling. To address
this possibility we include Xi,t, a vector of time-varying demographic controls obtained from
the Census and American Community Survey: total population, population density, median
age, average household size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African
Americans, number of housing units, percentage of vacant housing, and percentage of home
owners.
Given the count nature of the crime data, we estimate Equation (2.1) by maximum
likelihood using a Poisson regression. Results are similar using other estimators.15 Since
errors are expected to be correlated within block groups and access to gambling varies at
this level, we cluster our standard errors at the census block level in all our regressions.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Main Results
We examine whether greater access to video gambling affects property and violent crime
in Chicago. Table 2.1.a presents our core results using number of property crimes as the
dependent variable, while Table 2.1.b does the same for violent crimes. We begin with a
basic specification that does not control for access to riverboat casinos, community area
15See Appendix Table B.2 for results using Negative Binomial or OLS.
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time trends, nor time-varying demographic characteristics in column (1). Results show a
statistically significant increase in both property and violent crimes. Our estimates indicate
that being within three block groups of at least one video gambling establishment increases
property crime by almost 5% (s.e. 0.019) and violent crime by 9% (s.e. 0.021).16
These estimates are robust to using alternative specifications. Column (2) presents results
after accounting for proximity to Riverboat Casinos. Column (3) includes community area
time trends, and column (4) accounts for time-varying demographic characteristics. Column
(5) is our preferred specification that incorporates all the previous controls. The point
estimate increases to 6.7% (s.e. 0.018) for property and decreases to 7.5% (s.e. 0.019)
for violent crime, though they are not statistically different from the baseline specification
(p-value=0.520 and p-value=0.609). Estimates are very similar when using police district
or police beat specific time trends, accounting for any heterogeneity in policing strategy.17
These results suggest that access to gambling adds on average 0.28 and 0.10 property and
violent crimes per block group each month. In other words, legalizing video gambling has
contributed to approximately 4,100 and 1,450 additional property and violent crimes in
Chicago since the Video Gaming Act took effect.
Unlike some of the state or region-specific casino studies in the US (Gazel et al., 2001,
Wilson, 2001, Reece, 2010, Hyclak, 2011, Falls and Thompson, 2014) or the Canadian gam-
bling literature (Arthur et al., 2014, Humphreys and Soebbing, 2014), we do find that greater
16Given that we estimate non-linear Poisson regressions, estimated coefficients should have a slightly
different interpretation than OLS estimates. However, because the coefficient of interest is attached to a
dummy variable and the resulting estimates are small, the coefficient can be interpreted as the percentage
change in crime eβ̂ − 1 ≈ β̂.
17See Appendix Table B.4.
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access to gambling increases crime. Compared to research studying casino openings across
the US, our estimates are somewhat lower. Grinols and Mustard (2006) find average rises of
16% in property crime and 20% in violent crime. Evans and Topoleski (2002) find smaller
increases when accounting for state-specific time trends, about 10% for both types of crime.
However, crime effects due to casino openings are driven by multiple mechanisms, not just
gambling itself. For example, part of the increase in crime could be driven mechanically due
to an increase in the number of people visiting casino counties.
2.6.2 Further Results
We provide additional evidence that our results are indeed driven by access to video gambling
and are not spurious. We exploit two different dimensions of our variation in access to
gambling: its effects over time, and the availability of video gambling establishments.
To explore the effects of access to gambling over time, we conduct an event study analysis,
where we classify block groups in bins of six months with respect to when it first had a
gambling establishment within three blocks. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals
are presented in Figure 2.4. Both property and violent crimes show similar patterns: before
becoming exposed to video gambling we do not observe any significant differences in crime
between blocks that are within three blocks from gambling establishments compared to those
that are further away. This provides suggestive evidence validating our main identifying
assumption, that trends evolved similarly before video gambling was adopted.
The effect of access to video gambling on crime seems to be persistent. It increases over
time and stabilizes after twelve to eighteen months. On average, the medium-run effect
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on property crime it is 10.1% (s.e. 0.029), while for violent crime is 10.9% (s.e. 0.036).
This pattern, where the effects increase at first and stabilize is consistent with a number of
explanations. On one hand, it is consistent with the timing and expansion of video gambling
establishments described in Figure 2.1. On the other hand, it could also be consistent with
evidence that it takes around a year for individuals to become compulsive video gamblers
(Grinols and Mustard, 2006).
Finally, we find that effects are also increasing in availability of video gambling establish-
ments. One measure of availability is by volume played at gambling establishments within
three blocks. On average, the monthly volume played in establishments within three blocks
is $2.8 million. We present results in Figure 2.5, where we classify block groups within
three blocks of gambling establishments by total volume played at those establishments by
quartile. Indeed, results suggest that the effects are increasing in volume played as would be
expected. At the average volume of playing, property and violent crimes increase by 12.5%
(s.e. 0.024) and 10.4% (s.e. 0.030), respectively. We find that results are similar when using
several alternative measures of availability (or access) to video gambling: the number of
establishments,18 including volume played or number of establishments as a regressor, and
using access measures typically used in the trade literature.19
18See Appendix Figure B.1.
19See Appendix Table B.3.
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2.7 Robustness
2.7.1 Testing for Differential Trends
Identification of the effect of access to gambling on crime depends on the assumption that
in absence of video gambling, crimes in high access areas would have evolved similarly to
those further away. Though we cannot test this directly, we provide a number of tests that
lend support to it. One approach is to create placebo indicators that equal one for a period
of time before the unit becomes “treated” (i.e., a lead of the Within three blocks variable).
This variable would capture any differences in trends between groups before being exposed
to video gambling. We thus estimate Equation (2.1) and add the placebo variable.
Results are presented in Table 2.2, where in each column we change the time-span of
the placebo variable. Column (1) presents our preferred specification results from Table 2.1,
column (2) adds a placebo for one year prior, column (3) does it for 2 years prior and column
(4) for 3 years prior. The point estimates on all the placebo coefficients are close to zero and
we can reject the null hypothesis that the magnitude of effects of access to gambling and
the placebo are equal (the largest p-value is 0.0026). Additionally, the event study figures
presented before (Figure 2.4) tell the same story: there do not seem to be large systematic
differences in trends between groups.20 Taken together, the evidence is reassuring that our
findings are not driven by differences predating video gambling adoption.
20The findings are unchanged if we perform the same event study analysis using quarters instead of
semesters, although the estimates are more imprecise.
62
2.7.2 Proximity to Video Gambling and Displacement
Our identification strategy implicitly assumes that access to video gambling increases with
geographic proximity to video gambling establishments. Instead of estimating our model
using a dummy variable indicating that a block group has at least one video gambling
establishment within 3 blocks, we examine effects by block group (i.e., one block away, two,
etc.). If our effects were driven by increased access to gambling, we would expect that blocks
that are closer to gambling establishments experience a larger increase in crime. We show
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of these estimates by block in Figure 2.6. Both
property and violent crimes display a similar pattern: the effects are largest for the blocks
with highest access to gambling (within 1 block), and they decrease as we move away. At a
distance of three or four blocks the effects are zero and remain constant at greater distances.
For areas within one block of gambling establishments, the average increase in property and
violent crime is 13.1% (s.e. 0.038) and 14.4% (s.e. 0.040), respectively.
One concern with the interpretation of our results is that access to video gambling is
displacing crime within Chicago: shifting criminal activity towards areas closer to gambling
establishments. However, there are various results suggesting that our estimates capture
new crimes in Chicago rather than displacing existing crime. First, if our effects were driven
by displacement, we would expect to find effects decreasing monotonically with distance.
However, as shown in Figure 2.6, point estimates of effects are zero and remain at zero after
three or more census block groups away from a video gambling establishment. Second, when
including all block groups of Chicago or restricting the sample to block groups ever within
10 blocks of a video gambling establishment we find that point estimates are slightly smaller.
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Finally, if effects were driven solely by displacement, then there is a form of crime that
should not be affected by it: domestic incidents.21 We replicate our baseline analysis using
the number of domestic crimes as dependent variable in Table 2.4. Access to gambling
increased the number of domestic crimes by around 3.1% (s.e. 0.018). This is consistent
with evidence documenting the effect of emotional cues and family violence. For example,
Card and Dahl (2011) find that upset losses increase domestic violence by 10% during the
hour after a football game. Our estimates on domestic crime are substantially smaller than
the effects on property and violent crime, suggesting that emotional cues may play a smaller
role in the context of gambling.
2.7.3 Access to Bars
A potential concern is that the increase in crime may be driven by an increase in access
to bars rather than gambling. In 2016, video gambling terminals brought establishments
over $5,100 a month on average in revenues.22 This could have had two effects. First, it
may encourage new bars to open (or extend the life of existing bars). Given that there is
evidence documenting a positive correlation between bars and crime (Rossow and Norstrom,
2012, Anderson et al., 2017), an increase in the number of bars could drive our results.
Second, bars located inside Chicago may relocate outside the borders to benefit from video
gambling. This could have two opposing effects. On the one hand, the number of local bars
can decrease and this could bias our estimates downwards. On the other hand, it could shift
21Besides classifying a crime by type (e.g., homicide, aggravated battery, etc.), the Chicago Police De-
partment also notes whether the incident was domestic or not based on the relationship between the victim
and the offender. Specifically we focus on violent crimes complemented with simple assault and battery
classified as domestic plus offenses against family. We do so to get a domestic violence measure that best fit
the definition of the Department of Justice (see https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence)
22Own calculations based on data from the Illinois Gaming Board.
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people towards the border increasing the likelihood of crimes happening in areas near the
border.
Our results remain unchanged when accounting for access to bars. We use data on all
the liquor licenses granted by the Illinois Liquor Control Committee during the period of
July 2009 to March 2016.23 We geo-coded all establishments in the greater Chicago region
and constructed a monthly panel at the census block group level containing the number of
active liquor licenses. From this data we generate two variables: the number of bars in each
block group and the number of bars within three blocks.
Results are presented in Table 2.3, where the first two column replicates our original
analysis with and without community area trends, restricting the sample to the time period
for which we have data on liquor licenses. Column (3) adds the number of bars (in hundreds)
in same block as a control, column (4) adds number of bars (in hundreds) within three blocks
as a control, column (5) adds both but exclude video gambling access to show that access to
bars and video gambling are not highly correlated. Column (6) re-introduces access to video
gambling and includes both measures of access to bars. Notably, the coefficient of interest
remains very stable suggesting that changes in access to bars are not mediating the effect of
access to gambling and crime.
2.7.4 Mechanisms
Taken together, our evidence suggests that access to gambling has increased property and
violent crimes in Chicago. In this section we conduct a back of the envelope cost/benefit
calculation of the Video Gambling Act for the City of Chicago. For this exercise, we first
23This was all the data available at the time of our FOIA request.
65
break down effects by crime type and use cost estimates typically used in the literature
to impute the costs of crime. Because Chicago does not directly collect tax revenue from
gambling, calculating the benefit is not straight forward. Using alternative measures for
benefits, we find that the costs greatly outweigh the benefits.
We disaggregate results by type of crime in Table 2.5. Overall, we find that the effects
are mainly driven by property-type of crimes: note that violent crimes are mostly explained
by robbery, a violent form of property crime. Higher access to gambling adds 13.1% more
robberies (significant at the 1% level). Results for other forms of violent crime are mixed: we
find no significant effects on homicide or assault, though we do find statistically significant
increases (at the 10% level) in aggravated battery (5.99%) and sexual assault (14.1%). On
the other hand, the increase in property crime is driven mostly by motor vehicle thefts
(12.3%), followed by burglaries (5.6%) and larcenies (4.78%) – all statistically relevant at
the 5% level.
The large increase in robbery (and burglary, larceny, car theft) is consistent with direct
effects of gambling such as problem and pathological gambling, where financial distress may
drive individuals to commit crimes that have a monetary return. It is also consistent with
crime being more profitable, where individuals carry more cash to gamble (or from their
winnings) and become more profitable targets.24
24This has been observed in other contexts. For example, there is evidence that when Food Stamps
switched payments to Electronic Benefits Transfers (EBT) crime decreased (Wright et al., 2014).
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2.8 Back of the Envelope Cost/Benefit
We can obtain the back of the envelope estimates of the cost associated with the increase in
crime in Chicago as a result of video gambling. Following Chalfin and McCrary (2017a), we
use estimates produced by Cohen and Piquero (2009) on the costs of crime that take into
account both direct costs to the victim and indirect costs from reductions in the victim’s
quality of life. We present the costs for each type of crime in Table 2.6.a. Since the adoption
of video gambling, we estimate that it contributed on average an additional: 692 burglaries,
1,562 larcenies, 1,124 motor vehicle thefts, 120 sexual assaults, 323 aggravated batteries and
993 robberies. This amounts to an average total cost of almost $55.5 million with a 90%
confidence interval between $17.4 and $93.6 million (in 2016 dollars).
Video gambling does not provide any direct benefits to Chicago because the City does
not directly collect tax revenue from it. However, they do benefit indirectly through taxes
collected and redistributed by the State of Illinois. One shortfall is that we cannot observe
how much of video gambling state revenue was transferred to Chicago. As a proxy, we
use the 1.34% share of state income tax revenue distributed to Chicago in 2012.25 Since
video gambling was adopted, we estimate that Chicago received approximately $8.6 million
from the State Government, substantially less than the estimated average cost of $55.5
million, and is even less than half of the lower confidence limit.26 Alternatively, if all video
gambling establishments within three block groups from the Chicago border were to transfer
the municipal portion of taxes to Chicago instead of their own municipality, that would
25Based on total income tax collections from the Illinois Department of Revenue and State Income Tax
transfers to Chicago from the 2012 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report of Chicago.
26In total, the State of Illinois collected $640,463,278.57 in taxes since 2012 (in July 2016 dollars).
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amount to $9.9 million, still very far from the estimated cost of the crime it created within
Chicago.
What would the cost/benefit look like if Chicago were to legalize video gambling? We
calculate the cost by identifying potential video gambling locations using the liquor license
data and the estimates of effects of video gambling by crime type used above.27 The expected
monthly costs of legalizing video gambling in Chicago are presented in Table 2.6.b. We
estimate the average cost at around $5.4 million each month, with a 90% confidence interval
ranging from $1.7 to $9.3 million.
Overall, we cannot conclude that legalizing video gambling would generate larger tax
revenues than the costs in crime. We assume an optimistic scenario where video gambling
establishments generate tax revenues at the 90th percentile of establishments in other mu-
nicipalities within Cook county. Using the state-wide video gambling adoption rate of 62%
for Chicago would result in 2,170 video gambling establishments generating new tax revenue
for Chicago. Taken together, we estimate that legalizing video gambling in Chicago would
optimistically generate on average $5.3 million in tax revenue per month (90% confidence
interval between $4.88 and $5.78 million). Comparing the point estimates for costs and
benefits, we find a net loss of $0.3 million a month. However, notice that this difference
is not statistically significant. Furthermore, our cost estimates are much less precise than
those of benefits, where the upper confidence limit ($9.3 million) is twice that of the upper
limit for tax revenues ($5.78 million). Policymakers typically view legalizing gambling at a
convenient source of revenue. However, the way video gambling tax revenues are shared in
27See Appendix B.3 for details con how we computed costs and revenues for legalizing video gambling in
Chicago.
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Illinois does not seem to provide a benefit that is significantly large enough to outweigh the
social costs generated by increasing access to gambling across the board.
2.9 Conclusion
We estimate the effects of increasing access to gambling on crime taking advantage of the
legalization and expansion of video gambling in Illinois. Using crime data for Chicago, which
does not allow gambling, we compare areas in the city that have relatively higher access with
those that have lower access to gambling. We show that despite there being numerous casinos
in the vicinity of Chicago, the Video Gaming Act drastically increased access to gambling
in the City. In turn, higher access to gambling increases both property and violent crime.
This generated approximately 4,100 and 1,450 additional property and violent crimes in
Chicago, costing the City almost $55.5 million. Additionally, we estimate that the potential
tax revenues generated by legalizing video gambling in Chicago would not be significantly
larger than the costs from increased crime.
There are numerous avenues for future research. More work is necessary to better un-
derstand and disentangle the mechanisms at play. Our results suggest that the mechanisms
could be through problem and pathological gambling (i.e., financial distress) or increased
payoff of crime. Learning the extent to which one or the other operates is important to
design policies for mitigating the increase in crime. This is particularly important consid-
ering that video gambling is not only here to stay, but is set to expand in other states. To
the extent that the effects are driven by pathological gambling, there are several non-profits
and government organizations providing numerous services targeting gambling addiction.
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For example, the Illinois Alliance on Problem Gambling provides a number of services such
as phone and text-based counseling, and a free subscription service to receive motivational
messages via text message. Learning about the effectiveness of these programs would be a
step forward to stop the one-armed bandits.
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2.10 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: The Effect of Access to Video Gambling on Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(a) Property Crime
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0499*** 0.0556*** 0.0671*** 0.0499*** 0.0667***
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0180) (0.0188) (0.0180)
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991 991
(b) Violent Crime
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0900*** 0.0933*** 0.0792*** 0.0873*** 0.0753***
(0.0213) (0.0203) (0.0196) (0.0212) (0.0193)
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991 991
f(Distance to Riverboats) No Yes No No Yes
Community Trends No No Yes No Yes
Demographic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video gam-
bling establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Each coefficient is an
estimate of Equation (2.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors clustered at the block group level are
in parentheses. Within 3 blocks equals one if the census block group is within 3 block groups of a video
gambling establishment after the establishment adopted video gambling. All estimates include block group
fixed effects and month-year effects. f(Distance to Riverboats) is a quadratic function of distance, in miles,
from the block group centroid to the closest riverboat casino. Community Trends are community area time
trends. Demographic controls are obtained by extrapolating between the Census and American Community
Survey: total population, population density, median age, average household size, percentage males between
15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, number of housing units, percentage of vacant housing, and
percentage of home owners.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 2.2: The Effect of Access to Video Gambling on Crime, with Placebos
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Property Crime
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0667*** 0.0723*** 0.0733*** 0.0606***
(0.0180) (0.0198) (0.0206) (0.0221)
Placebo (1 year prior) 0.0153
(0.0153)
Placebo (2 years prior) 0.0108
(0.0150)
Placebo (3 years prior) -0.00768
(0.0145)
P-Value (Within 3 = Placebo) 0.0026 0.0008 0.0002
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991
(b) Violent Crime
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0753*** 0.0683*** 0.0870*** 0.0947***
(0.0193) (0.0209) (0.0218) (0.0233)
Placebo (1 year prior) -0.0224
(0.0208)
Placebo (2 years prior) 0.0222
(0.0177)
Placebo (3 years prior) 0.0276
(0.0175)
P-Value (Within 3 = Placebo) 0.0001 0.0016 0.0006
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video
gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Each
coefficient is an estimate of Equation (2.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors clustered at
the block group level are in parentheses. Within 3 blocks equals one if the census block group
is within 3 block groups of a video gambling establishment after the establishment adopted video
gambling. Placebo variables equal one for the indicated period of time (1, 2 or 3 years) before an
establishment within three block groups first adopts video gambling. All estimates include block
group fixed effects, month-year effects, a quadratic function of distance to the closest riverboat
casino, community area-time trends, and demographic controls obtained by extrapolating between
the Census and American Community Survey: total population, population density, median age,
average household size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans,
number of housing units, percentage of vacant housing, and percentage of home owners.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Access to Video Gambling on Crime, Controlling for Access to Bars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) Property Crime
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0526*** 0.0650*** 0.0641*** 0.0659*** - 0.0650***
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0176) (0.0177)
Number of Bars in:
Same Block (/100) 2.382 3.599** 3.522**
(1.798) (1.735) (1.729)
Within 3 Blocks (/100) -0.327* -0.449** -0.457**
(0.178) (0.186) (0.181)
Observations 98,109 98,109 98,109 98,109 98,109 98,109
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991 991 991
(b) Violent Crime
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0717*** 0.0548*** 0.0539*** 0.0545*** - 0.0539***
(0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0205)
Number of Bars in:
Same Block (/100) 1.565 1.716 1.581
(1.542) (1.669) (1.686)
Within 3 Blocks (/100) 0.0590 0.0105 -0.0061
(0.215) (0.229) (0.231)
Observations 98,010 98,010 98,010 98,010 98,010 98,010
Number of blocks 990 990 990 990 990 990
Community Trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video gambling estab-
lishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Each coefficient is an estimate of Equation
(2.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors clustered at the block group level are in parentheses. Within 3 blocks
equals one if the census block group is within 3 block groups of a video gambling establishment after the establishment
adopted video gambling. Number of bars is the number of active liquor licenses in the same block group or within three
block groups. All estimates include block group fixed effects, month-year effects, a quadratic function of distance to the
closest riverboat casino, community area-time trends, and demographic controls obtained by extrapolating between
the Census and American Community Survey: total population, population density, median age, average household
size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, number of housing units, percentage of
vacant housing, and percentage of home owners.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Access to Video Gambling on Domestic Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic Crime
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0424** 0.0402** 0.0415** 0.0311* 0.0313*
(0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0177) (0.0177)
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991 991
f(Distance to Riverboats) No Yes No No Yes
Community Trends No No Yes No Yes
Demographic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video
gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of domestic crimes. Each coefficient is
an estimate of Equation (2.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors clustered at the block
group level are in parentheses. Within 3 blocks equals one if the census block group is within 3
block groups of a video gambling establishment after the establishment adopted video gambling.
All estimates include block group fixed effects and month-year effects. f(Distance to Riverboats)
is a quadratic function of distance, in miles, from the block group centroid to the closest riverboat
casino. Community Trends are community area time trends. Demographic controls are obtained by
extrapolating between the Census and American Community Survey: total population, population
density, median age, average household size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of
African Americans, number of housing units, percentage of vacant housing, and percentage of home
owners.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Access to Video Gambling on Crime, by Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Property Crime
Motor
Arson Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft
Within 3 blocks (=1) 0.0277 0.0560** 0.0478** 0.123***
(0.118) (0.0269) (0.0233) (0.0310)
Observations 127,254 127,508 127,254 127,381
Number of blocks 1,002 1,004 1,002 1,003
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(b) Violent Crime
Sexual Aggravated Aggravated
Homicide Assault Assault Battery Robbery
Within 3 blocks (=1) 0.0103 0.141* -0.0453 0.0599* 0.131***
(0.115) (0.0764) (0.0365) (0.0316) (0.0280)
Observations 84,074 116,713 125,730 124,968 124,968
Number of blocks 662 919 990 984 984
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video
gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Each coefficient is
an estimate of Equation (2.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors clustered at the block group level
are in parentheses. Within 3 blocks equals one if the census block group is within 3 block groups of a
video gambling establishment after the establishment adopted video gambling. All estimates include block
group fixed effects, month-year effects, a quadratic function of distance to the closest riverboat casino,
community area-time trends, and demographic controls obtained by extrapolating between the Census
and American Community Survey: total population, population density, median age, average household
size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, number of housing units,
percentage of vacant housing, and percentage of home owners.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 2.6: Back of the Envelope Cost Estimates
Crime Type Estimated Cost Per Incident (in 2016 $) Total Cost 90% CI
New Incidents (Cohen and Piquero, 2009) (in 2016 $) (in mil. $)
(a) Total Cost for Chicago Since Video Gambling Act Adopted
Property 9,509,120.52 [4.66; 14.36]
Motor Vehicle Theft 1,123.66 6,326.41 7,108,707.54 [4.16; 10.06]
Larceny 1,562.32 517.18 807,995.92 [0.16; 1.46]
Burglary 692.20 2,300.51 1,592,417.06 [0.33; 2.85]
Violent 45,987,751.33 [12.72; 79.26]
Robbery 992.70 13,803.08 13,702,279.34 [8.88; 18.52]
Aggravated Battery 322.67 42,559.50 13,732,543.18 [1.82; 25.65]
Sexual Assault 119.48 155,284.67 18,552,928.80 [2.02; 35.09]
Total 55,496,871.85 [17.37; 93.62]
(b) Monthly Cost of Legalizing Video Gambling in Chicago
Property 856,134.86 [0.41; 1.31]
Motor Vehicle Theft 95.72 6,326.41 605,565.30 [0.35; 0.86]
Larceny 216.49 517.18 111,963.53 [0.02; 0.2]
Burglary 60.25 2,300.51 138,606.03 [0.03; 0.25]
Violent 4,603,948.67 [1.27; 7.94]
Robbery 99.03 13,803.08 1,366,963.44 [0.89; 1.85]
Aggravated Battery 28.38 42,559.50 1,207,723.89 [0.16; 2.26]
Sexual Assault 13.07 155,284.67 2,029,261.34 [0.22; 3.84]
Total (per month) 5,460,083.54 [1.67; 9.25]
Notes: All dollar amounts in 2016 dollars. Estimated number of new incidents is based on coefficients obtained in Table 2.5.
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Figure 2.1: Number of Video Gambling Establishments in Illinois























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dots represent video gambling establishments operating in April 2014. Map of Chicago census block groups.
Each block group is classified by geographic proximity to video gambling establishments. For example, one block denotes
directly adjacent to a block (outside Chicago) with at least one video gambling establishment, two block denotes two
blocks away (i.e., adjacent-of-adjacent), and so on. Six block is six or more block groups away from a video gambling
establishment.
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Months with respect to video gambling establishment opening within 3 blocks
Coefficient 95% CI
(b) Violent Crimes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video gambling establishment.
Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for estimating
Equation (2.1) using dummy variables indicating timing with respect to first video gambling establishment operating within
three blocks. The omitted category is 6 to 1 months before video gambling establishment operates within three blocks
(-6/-1).
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Volume Gambled Within 3 Blocks
Coefficient 95% CI
(b) Violent Crimes
Note: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video gambling establishment.
Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for estimating
Equation (2.1) using dummy variables by volume played at video gambling establishments within three blocks. Classified
into four groups by quartile of monthly volume played: Low ($1 - $801,313.7), Mid Low ($801,313.7 - $1,603,046), Mid
High ($1,603,046 - $3,442,390), High ($3,442,390+). The omitted category is zero volume.
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Blocks to closest Video Gambling Establishment
Coefficient 95% CI
(b) Violent Crimes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video gambling establishment.
Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for estimating
Equation (2.1) using dummy variables for proximity of closest video gambling establishment (i.e., one block, two, etc.).
The omitted category is 6 blocks (that is, has at least one video gambling establishment within six blocks).
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Chapter 3
Do More Eyes on the Street Reduce




Students routinely encounter a wide range of safety issues when commuting to and from
schools across the country. According to Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention, most (63%) violent crimes committed by juveniles occur on school days and nearly
one-fifth (19%) of juvenile violent crimes occur in the 4 hours between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m. on
school days. Additionally, the rate of victimization at schools is high, with 60.6% of nonfatal
victimization for students aged 12-18 occurring at school in 2015 (National Crime Victimiza-
tion Survey). Studies such as Mathews et al. (2009), Schwartz and Gorman (2003), Grogger
(1997), and Billings and Phillips (2017) have found that exposure to crime, especially violent
crime, may affect educational achievement, and implications for long-term outcomes have
been established by Braga et al. (2012), Nagin (1998, 2013), Lum and Koper (2014), and
1This chapter is based with joint work with Dan McMillen and Ruchi Singh.
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Chalfin and McCrary (2017b). Increasing public safety and crime prevention has long been
at the center stage of policy debate. Previous empirical studies suggest that increasing or
redeploying of police to specific geographic areas (or “hotspots”) is an effective means of
reducing crime.2 However, most of these studies restrict their analysis to police enforcement
practices, such as short term exogenous changes in the deployment of police following a ter-
ror attack (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004, Klick and Tabarrok, 2005, Draca et al., 2011),
or short term randomized experiments, such as “crackdowns” (Weisburd et al., 2009, Braga
et al., 2012, Lum and Koper, 2014). Research on social interaction and safety suggests that
community involvement can help reduce crime (Krivo, 2014).
This chapter examines an alternative way of policing to increase student safety: hiring
civilians to guard schools for a few hours each day. To study this alternative strategy, we use
the Chicago Safe Passage program. The program places civilian guards around schools during
arrival and dismissal times. The Safe Passage program is jointly run by the Chicago Public
School and the Chicago Police Department, along with community organizations. The Safe
Passage program began with 35 schools in the 2009-2010 school year and has expanded to
cover about 20% of Chicago public schools in the 2015-2016 school year. Safe Passage guards
are expected to be knowledgeable of the community area they serve. The guards receive a
background check and are trained on various de-escalation strategies and safety protocols.
The guards patrol designated streets designated as “Safe Passage Routes” for approximately
two and a half hours in morning and afternoon times when students commute to and from
school. The guards wear neon jackets, and the designated routes have signs indicating that
2See for example Braga et al. (2012), Nagin (1998, 2013), Lum and Koper (2014), and Chalfin and
McCrary (2017b)
84
they are Safe Passage Routes.
Previous studies have criticized such “hot spot” policing because 1) any crime reduction
may only be short term, and 2) there may be spatial spillovers to neighboring areas. We
evaluate these two criticisms in the context of the Safe Passage Program. More specifically,
we analyze the effectiveness of this alternative policing strategy in reducing crime, whether
the effects are persistent, and whether the program leads to spatial spillover of crime.
The key challenge in estimating the effects of Safe Passages on crime is identifying the
counterfactual scenario, i.e. what would have happened to crime if guards were not present?
The exact location of these Safe Passage routes allows us to exploit variation in crime within
adjacent small geographic areas. We combine detailed geo-located crime data with the
location of guards and exploit the timing of the start of the program and the location of the
guards to estimate the effect on crime. The exact start date of the program and the duty
times of the Safe Passage guards allows us to control for preexisting differences.
Our results suggest that the Safe Passage program is a cost effective alternative policing
strategy. We find that the guards’ presence is effective at reducing crime in the surveilled
areas, and that crime is not displaced to nearby areas. Guarded areas experience a significant
reduction in crime as compared to neighboring areas, with the effect being strongest for
violent crime. The effect is restricted to times of day when they are on duty. The sharpest
reduction in violent crime is associated with early Safe Passage routes, while the reduction
in property crime is explained by later expansion of the program. The decline in crime is
stronger for high schools as compared with elementary and middle schools. Our results are
consistent studies finding that place-based initiatives do not lead to spatial displacement
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in most cases (Sorg et al., 2013, 2014), and even in cases where displacement occurs the
neighboring increase in crime do not overwhelm the crime reduction benefits (Guerette and
Bowers, 2009).
An important difference between the policing variation studied in previous research and
our context is that the presence of Safe Passage guards is more likely to be permanent
rather than temporary. This feature allows us to compare the long and short term effects.
Sherman (1990) shows that the effectiveness of initial crackdowns declines over time, i.e., an
“initial deterrence decay” that he suggests is caused by criminals learning over time that they
had overestimated the risk of being caught. Consistent with Sherman’s 1990 theory of initial
deterrence decay, Sorg et al. (2013, 2014) find evidence that deterrent effects of Philadelphia’s
Foot Patrol experiment slowed down over the course of the experimental period, with the
effect fading to zero after foot patrolling had continued for 22 weeks. In contrast, we find
that Chicago’s Safe Passage program has had a persistent reduction in crime three years
after the experiment began. We find that the effects are persistent over time and continue
to lower crime throughout the implementation period. Schools that had the program for
more than two school years show a significant reduction in crime, with an approximate 20%
decline in violent crime.
In addition, we find improvements in attendance, with Safe Passage schools witnessing
an annual rate of change in attendance of about 2.5 percentage points. To identify the effect
of the Safe Passage guards on school attendance, we supplement our data with school level
information. To address potential concerns of selection bias of the guarded schools, we use
propensity score matching to find suitable controls. These results suggest that the presence
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of Safe Passage guards acts as a deterrent for criminals and helps to encourage students
to attend schools more regularly. The Safe Passage program is a relatively cheap way of
increasing safety. Based on estimates of victim costs, we estimate that the benefits of the
crimes deterred by the program are around $38.6 million a year.3 In contrast, the estimated
total cost of the program to be $17.8 million for the 2015-2016 school year.
Our results suggest that placing civilian guards around schools is both an inexpensive
and effective way of increasing safety and attendance. The program provides an interesting
insight into policies aimed at reducing crime. The reduction in crime is driven through
deterrence with guards rather than incapacitation. The guards are not equivalent to police,
and they do not have the tools or training to incapacitate criminals. However, they do
have the ability to intervene to defuse potential incidents, call 911, or simply make their
presence known. Thus, our research provides evidence of the effectiveness of an alternative
policing strategy in which civilians are used for patrolling instead of police officers, and
our findings can help guide policy makers around the country who have adopted or are
considering adopting similar programs.4 Our study is also relevant to the broader literature
on private policing, and more specifically on the literature showing that university policing
has the potential to significant reduce crime rates (e.g., MacDonald et al. (2012) and Heaton
et al. (2016)).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we provide back-
ground information on the Chicago Safe Passage program. Next, Section 3.3 describes our
3Our estimates are larger if we use instead willingness to pay estimates, which give us a mean program
benefit of around $97.4 million.
4Los Angeles, Philadelphia and New Britain (CT) have in place similar programs designed to offer safe
routes in Public schools (https://goo.gl/h6qLDi).
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data and Section 3.4 presents our main results, including the effect of Safe Passage guards
on crime and a cost-benefit analysis. In section 4, we analyze the effect of the program on
attendance rate, while Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Chicago’s Safe Passage Program
The Chicago Safe Passage program started in the 2009-2010 school year with 35 schools.
Since then, the program has been expanded to cover new schools almost every year, with
about 20% of Chicago Public Schools (CPS) covered in the 2015-2016 school year.5 The
Safe Passage program is jointly run by the CPS and the Chicago Police Department (CPD),
along with community organizations. In 2015-16, 22 vendors worked for the program. The
vendors are responsible for on-ground enforcement of the program and hiring neighborhood
residents to patrol the Safe Passage routes.
In this setting, “Safe Passage guards” are very different from police officers. They are
civilians, primarily parents and grandparents of the children who attend the schools or com-
munity members who are knowledgeable or the local community area and interested in mak-
ing the neighborhood safer. They are subject to thorough background checks and received
specialized training, although neither the background checks nor the training are as rigorous
as those expected of public police officers. Guards are trained during the summer to provide
them with relationship-building skills, de-escalation strategies, and thorough knowledge of
other safety protocols. This comprehensive training enables employees to proactively iden-
tify and report safety risks. The guards have strict protocols to follow in terms of reporting
5The CPS system comprises about 650 schools. Our analysis analyzes the expansion up to the 2015-2016
school year including crime data up to August of 2016.
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any crime or suspicious activity that they witness and have cellphones to enable them to
report crime by either contacting 911 or a 24-hour student safety number. Also, unlike public
police, they are unarmed and do not have the power to make arrests. Employees work part
time in the morning and afternoon when students commute to and from school.
The guards patrol “Safe Passage Routes” that are determined by identifying the paths
that most students take when walking to school from their homes or bus stops. The pre-
liminary route map is shared with parents, school personnel, and the local community to
get feedback before deciding on the final routes. The catchment area of the guards is ap-
proximately one block along each of the routes. As of 2015-2016, the Safe Passage program
employed about 1,300 workers, who were paid approximately $10 per hour to work for about
five hours a day on weekdays when schools are in session. They work for two and a half
hours in the morning and again in the afternoon around school dismissal time.6 The total
cost of the program was $17.8 million for the 2016 fiscal year.
The Safe Passage program was rolled out in three major phases. Table 3.1 shows the
number of Safe Passages rolled out by school year and the number of schools they cover,
while Figure 3.1 shows the location by roll-out year.7 The program was rolled out in three
major phases. The program was introduced in the 2009-2010 school year, when 35 schools
in areas with relatively high crime rates became part of the program. The largest and most
6We do not have data on actual police deployment along the Safe Passage Routes. According to our
discussions with CPS, there was no additional deployment of police in these areas. Although it is possible
that there is some additional police monitoring of these areas, our discussions indicate that there was no
increase in police officers after the roll out of the program. Additionally, regressions for the number of police
officers in a district do not indicate any increase after the implementation of the Safe Passage Program, as
shown in Table A4.
7Appendix Figure C.1 shows each Safe Passage roll out phases separately. Since some schools where close
to each other, some Safe Passages cover more than one school.
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advertised expansion took place in the 2013-2014 school year. In that year, 50 schools were
closed and schools receiving these students. designated as “welcoming” schools, were added
to the program.8 The expansion of the program to these schools was the response to some
safety concerns for the children who had to switch schools and, in their commuting, may
have to cross gang boundaries. The last major program expansion took place in 2014-2015
school year covering 39 additional schools.
Prior to the implementation of the Safe Passage program in the 2009-2010 school year, the
CPS rolled out the pilot program in 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years, covering around
20 high schools. The pilot program proposed two strategies aiming to increase safety in and
around the selected high schools. The first strategy involved patrolling and monitoring areas
surrounding the high schools between 1 p.m. and 5 p.m. on school days. Secondly, micro-
pod cameras were installed, with officers serving as monitors during afternoon school hours.
According to research carried out by the Chicago Police Department, the pilot program led
to a 20% decline in criminal incidents around Safe Passage schools, a 27% drop in incidents
among students, and a 7% increase in attendance over the past two years in high schools
that implemented the pilot program.
3.3 Data Sources
Our empirical analysis is based on crime incident reports, Safe Passage location data, char-
acteristics of the schools, and census block groups. The crime incident data are based on
police reports between January 2001 and August 2016, as provided by the City of Chicago
8A map of the welcoming schools can be found here: https://goo.gl/nbjVdC (last access April 11,
2018).
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Data Portal. This information was extracted from the Chicago Police Department’s Citizen
Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CPD CLEAR) system. The data set provides
the date, time, classification of the type of crimes committed.9
The classification of each incident follows the Illinois Uniform Crime Reporting (IUCR)
code, which is compliant with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) program. All crimes are classified into categories following a hierarchy.10
FBI’s UCR program only collects statistics on violent and property crime, with violent crime
having the highest hierarchy followed by property crime. The hierarchical categorization also
implies that in case of multiple offenses, the incident is classified as one which is the highest
in the hierarchy. As a result of this classification procedure, reports for crime lower in the
hierarchy will be biased downwards. We restrict our attention to violent and property crimes
because they have higher priorities in the coding and thus are more likely to be reported to
the police.11
The data set has several limitations. First, the CPD CLEAR data set reflects only
incidents in which the police responded and completed a case report. Thus, it reflects the
number of reported crimes rather than being an exhaustive list of the number of incidents.
A second limitation is that there are some recording errors in the reports data set regarding
the precise date and time of the incident. If the address of the incident is not present we
exclude the observation from the final data set. Crime incidents are recorded on the hour
9The last two digits of the address are withheld in the crime data, which means that addresses are
recorded at approximately the block level.
10 For example, if a burglar breaks into a house and steals several items and hurts the homeowner, the
incident is classified as violent, although it also includes a property crime.
11Violent crimes are defined by the FBI’s UCR as those that involve force or threat of force and include
murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crime
includes burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
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when the reporter cannot reasonably estimate the exact time of the crime.12
Data on the schools and the Safe Passage routes were obtained through the CPS web site
and the City of Chicago Data Portal. The school data includes demographic information for
the student body, the proportion of students eligible for free lunch, the proportion of students
who are bilingual, and overall attendance records. Shapefiles with the location of the Safe
Passage routes are available through the City of Chicago Data Portal. The information on
the year in which the Program was started in each of the schools was obtained from the
Chicago Public School via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action.
Finally, we also use the American Community Survey (ACS) for the period 2009-2014 to
obtain data on census block group characteristics. The demographic data include median
income, average education, unemployment rates, poverty rates, and housing characteristics.
Additionally, we use community area and census tract boundaries to control for varying time
trends. Community areas, census tract boundaries, and data on traffic counts come from
the City of Chicago Data Portal. We use the Census 2010 definitions for the Census Tract
boundaries.
3.4 Do more eyes on the street reduce crime?
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Our objective is to identify the change in crime due to the presence of Safe Passage guards.
In an ideal setting, an experiment could be conducted by randomly placing guards near some
12Burglary and vehicle crime are among the most common types of crime where the exact time of occurrence
is most likely to be unknown because the crime may happen when the victim is not present. Thus, many
agencies record the time as the range of time from the point when the victim was last home until the crime
was discovered. Some methods such as aoristic analysis have been suggested to overcome the imprecision
inherent in spatial temporal crime data (Ratcliffe, 2000).
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schools and not others. In this setting, we would unambiguously identify the effects of guards
on crime by comparing how crime changes in areas that are guarded relative to unguarded
areas. The main concern with our non-experimental setting is the fact that schools were
not randomly chosen to participate in the program. Table 3.2 shows that more vulnerable
schools in high crime, low-income neighborhoods were chosen to be part of the program.
The correlation between crime and both observable and unobservable characteristics of
the Safe Passage schools thus poses a challenge for the identification of the causal effect of
Safe Passage guards on crime (see Table 3.3). To overcome this issue, we focus on small
geographic areas around Safe Passage routes, namely, cells of one eight by one eight mile
(i.e. 1/64 of a square mile) in the neighboring areas of a Safe Passage school.13 Figure
3.2 illustrates our gridding strategy for the designated Safe Passage route associated with
Kelly High School. Cells that have a Safe Passage route are designated as Safe Passage
Cells. To avoid unbalanced location of treated and control areas (Donohue et al., 2013),
we construct our control areas as cells that are contiguous in any direction up to three
cells over.14 This strategy naturally implies a spatial differences in differences approach that
compares crime counts in cells that are on a Safe Passage route with adjacent cells before and
after the program started. The spatial differences in differences approach helps to account
for confounding unobserved neighborhood attributes (Diamond and McQuade, 2016, Pope
13This approach is similar to Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), but we replace street blocks by cells of
one eighth by one eighth mile. The advantage of this approach is that it gives us areas of equal size that are
approximately the same length as a standard Chicago block. Moreover, given the small area of these cells
we are confident that a guard standing on the Safe Passage route is able to monitor it. The results remain
robust when we replace cells by street blocks (see Table C.1).
14The cell definition has the added advantage that allows us to analyze the potential spatial displacement
effects of crimes into neighboring areas. If the cell is “One Cell Over” to one Safe Passage and “Two Cell
Over” to another Safe Passage, we denote the cell as “One Cell Over”.
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and Pope, 2015, Cui and Walsh, 2015, Ellen et al., 2013, Linden and Rockoff, 2008a, Pope,
2008)
Leveraging the geolocation of crime, we match violent and property crime incidents to
each cell. We identify violent and property crimes that take place during the day when Safe
Passage guards are present, and also in evening hours (5:30 pm to 6:30 am) when guards
are not present. We also distinguish between school and non-school days (i.e. weekends and
summer months). Given the small size of the geographic areas, we aggregate the number of
incidents to months to avoid an excess of zero counts. In our main specification, we exclude
crime that occurred during weekends, night and summer break.
Our baseline specification is then:
#Crimesit = β SafePassageCelli ∗ Postt + θ OneCell Overi ∗ Postt
+ φTwoCellsOveri ∗ Postt + γi + δt + uit (3.1)
where #Crimesit is the monthly number of crimes (violent or property) in cell i in month-
year t. SafePassageCelli is an indicator variable with a value of one for cells that have Safe
Passage route. OneCell Overi is an indicator for cells that are adjacent to a Safe Passage
Cell, and TwoCellsOveri indicates that the cell is two cells from the Safe Passage Cell.
We interact these spatial indicators with an indicator Postt, which equals one after the Safe
Passage program started in a school. We complete the specification with a cell fixed effect
(γi), month-year fixed effects (δt), and the error term uit . The omitted category is three
cells over in our preferred specification. Thus, in the difference-in-difference specification,
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crime in treated cells is being compared to crime in three cells over.
The parameter of interest, β, captures the causal effect of the Safe Passage route on crime.
The hypothesis is that cells on a Safe Passage route should see a decrease in crime at times
that Safe Passage guards are present. The advantage of this approach is that by including
spatial fixed effects and focusing on crimes before and after the Safe Passage implementation,
we can difference out time invariant omitted variables. Our main identifying assumption is
that Safe Passage Cells have similar underlying trends as the non-guarded adjacent cells. In
subsection 3.4.4, we provide evidence suggesting that this assumption holds.
As has become standard in the literature, we estimate count data models for equation
(3.1) using a Poisson regression. However, our results do not change if we use other estimators
such as negative binomial regression or ordinary least squares.15 To account for the possible
correlation between errors at the treatment level, we cluster our standard error at the route
level in all of our regressions.16
3.4.2 Base Results for Crime
In this section, we present our main results for the overall effect of the Safe Passage pro-
gram on crime. Table 3.4 presents our results for violent and property crimes.17 We start
with a basic specification in column (1) that shows a more basic measure of proximity to
guard presence, SafePassageCelli ∗Postt, which has a value one for every month after the
program was implemented for every cell that has a Safe Passage route. This regression uses
15See Table C.2 for results using negative binomial regression and OLS
16Our results also hold if we cluster at the cell level. The results are presented in Table C.1 columns (2)
and (6).
17We restrict our sample to the period January 2006 to August 2016. The choice of pre-program period
does not play a significant role. Results presented in Table A1 columns (3) and (7) are similar when using
an extended sample (January 2001- August 2016).
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adjacent cells up to the third one over as controls. Results show that cells that have a Safe
Passage route see a decrease in violent and property crime after the program implementa-
tion. Violent crimes decline by 14.3% and property crimes by 3.4%, but the estimates for
property crime are noisy.18
Although these results show that crime goes down, a potential concern is that, instead
of reducing crime, the presence of Safe Passage guards is displacing crime to the nearby
unguarded areas. We test this hypothesis by adding controls for adjacent areas. Columns
(2) and (5) control for spillovers in the first adjacent cell. Results for Safe Passage Cell
remain unchanged, and suggest that violent crime in the adjacent cell did not change with
respect to the control cells (i.e. cells that are two or three cells adjacent to the Safe Passage
Cell).
The results of our preferred specification are presented in columns (3) and (6) of Table
3.4 and in Figure 3.3. The coefficients on One Cell Over and Two Cells Over are insignificant
across the specifications, suggesting that crime is not being displaced to the adjacent cells.
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows that violent crime declines by 14.1% with no evidence of spatial
displacement of crime. Panel (b) shows a decline in property crime in guarded cells and a
small increase in adjacent cells, none of which are statistically significant.19 The hierarchi-
cal classification procedure for crime might be a possible explanation for this insignificant
18The interpretation of a difference-in-difference coefficient from a Poisson regression is exp(β)−1, although
the approximation exp(β) − 1 ≈ β is valid for small enough β
19Sorg et al. (2014) point that police officers make adjustments to boundary during an intervention, as
observed in Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment, which might cause researchers to incorrectly estimate the
actual effect of the program and mismeasure the spatial displacement of crime. Our discussions with the
CPS suggests that guards mostly stand on the Safe Passage routes assigned to them. However, if they stray
into the neighboring areas, our estimates might be a lower bound of the true estimates as the decrease in
crime will be lower in the treated area. We do not expect the straying of guards to affect crime three cells
over as these areas are not close to the Safe Passage routes.
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estimate. Crimes are classified according to the highest category, with severe offenses clas-
sified as violent and less serious offenses classified as property crimes. If the severity of the
crimes tended to decline after the implementation of the program, then a higher propor-
tion of offenses will tend to be classified as property crime, and as a result, there may be
some increase in the number of property crimes after the program started. Moreover, our
estimated effects for property crime might be a lower bound due to over reporting of crime
in the presence of guards. Na and Gottfredson (2013) find that as schools increase their
use of police officers, the percentage of crimes involving non-serious violent offenses that are
reported to law enforcement increases.
We use Poisson models for our preferred specification. However, we show in Appendix
Table C.2 that our results are robust to alternative specifications such as Negative Binomial
regression and OLS. We focus on the number of violent and property crimes rather than per
capita rates for several reasons. First, our objective is to analyze how the program affects
the number of incidents rather than the intensity of crime for a given number of people.
Second, we are interested in analyzing very small geographic areas; the zones can include
areas where residents do not live even though they may travel through the zones frequently.
Third, precise population estimates for such a small geographic level is not available at a
monthly frequency. Moreover, Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2010) argue that crime per unit of
land is a better measure of crime intensity than crime rates when analyzing geographic areas
smaller than city level. However, for robustness we also estimate OLS models with crime
rates as the dependent variable (Appendix Table C.2). We use two alternative measures of
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crime rates by dividing counts of crime by population in the cell and traffic counts.20 The
estimates are consistent with our earlier results.
Crime rates and trends vary substantially across Chicago neighborhoods (Papachris-
tos, 2013). To account for this variation and to verify that our results are not driven by
time-varying neighborhood trends we include various trends in Appendix Table C.3. Our
specifications also include alternative definitions of neighborhoods, including community ar-
eas, census tract, and safe passage neighborhood. We also include police district or police
beat specific trends to account for any heterogeneity in policing strategies. Our findings are
robust to these alternative specifications.
As the program was expanded to include more schools, some Safe Passages became very
close to each other. As a result, some cells may contain more than one route, and thus might
have been more intensely guarded. We reestimate equation (1) controlling for the intensity
of treatment by including a variable representing the number of Safe Passage routes in a
cell.21 Results are consistent with our previous findings and are shown in Appendix Table
C.6. Thus, our findings do not appear to be driven by areas with more intensive guarding.
3.4.3 Additional Results for Crime
In this section, we provide further evidence that our results are not spurious. A possible
concern could be that crime is actually simply being displaced. We explore this hypothesis
and do not find evidence of spatial displacement. In columns (1) and (6) of Table 3.5, we
20We use the population estimates from census and traffic counts from Chicago Data Portal. We assume
uniform population density in the census tract. We estimate population by multiplying the ratio of area in
the cell to census tract by population in the tract.
21There are a few cells that have more than two Safe Passage routes running through them. Thus, we lose
power when we try to estimate the varying effects by intensity of treatment.
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present estimates of equation (1) after dropping the first and second adjacent cell. This
approach creates a buffer area between treatment and control areas. Point estimates suggest
that our previous findings are not driven by an increase in crime in the adjacent areas. In
the remaining columns, we assess the impact of the program on the adjacent areas. For these
specifications, we drop the treated area, i.e. cells with Safe Passage routes. Results show no
significant changes in crime in the adjacent areas as a consequence of the presence of guards,
giving us reassurance that crime is not being displaced to nearby areas.
Another potential problem is the possibility of time-varying unobserved characteristics
that have a different effect on crime in Safe Passage Cells relative to adjacent cells. Differ-
ential effects could occur if, for example, the city chose to invest in areas with Safe Passage
Cells by securing and/or demolishing buildings, cleaning vacant lots, removing instances of
graffiti, replacing and repairing street lights, etc. In such an event, a decline in crime in Safe
Passage cells relative to adjacent cells could have been produced indirectly by improvements
in the conditions of these areas (Aliprantis and Hartley, 2015), rather than as a direct result
of the presence of the program’s guards.
If these general improvements in the condition of Safe Passage cells are the actual source
of the reduction in crime, there should not be any differential effect on crime for times when
Safe Passage guards are present relative to times they are not. To test this potential concern,
we use the information on the timing of incidents and run the same specification as equation
(1) for times when guards are not present - night times (5:30 pm - 6:30 am), summer months
when schools are not in session (July and August), and on weekends.
Results shown in Table 3.6 suggest that the presence of Safe Passage guards is the source
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of the reduction in crime rather than general improvements in the Safe Passage route areas.
Columns (1) and (4) summarize the results for night times, columns (2) and (5) present
the results for summer months, columns (3) and (6) present the results for weekends, and
columns (4) and (8) presents the results for all three placebo times combined. None of the
results is statistically significant at conventional levels of significance.
Our results could also be questioned if the city had increased police presence in the
Safe Passage areas. Responses from the city could have either been on the extensive or
intensive margin i.e. increase in the number of police officers in districts with Safe Passages
or, redeploying forces within districts.22 Appendix Table C.5 shows that our results remain
the same when controlling for the number of officers in the district. Finally, it could be that
police forces are redeployed within the district. We cannot test this hypothesis as data on the
time and location of police deployment is not available, but our discussions with CPD and
CPS suggest that there was no additional deployment of police officers in the Safe Passage
areas.
To explore the effects over time, we perform an event study analysis. We classify cells
by bins of school years with respect to when the program started. Figure 3.4 shows point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals. We see similar patterns in violent and property
crime: before the adoption of the program we do not observe any significant differences in
cells that are on a Safe passage route when compared to our control group.23 This provides
22We obtained data from the CPD and found that there were not more police officers in a given police
district as a result of the number of Safe Passage in the district, results are shown in Appendix Table C.4.
These data were obtained by a FOIA request and the sample period was restricted by the records kept by
CPD. The data contains the number of sworn Chicago police personnel by police district and by month
between January 2008 to September 2016.
23The p-value of the joint test that all the pre-program coefficients are equal to zero is 0.8946 for violent
crime and 0.0724 for property crimes.
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suggestive evidence of our main identifying assumption, which is that trends evolved similarly
in cells that are on Safe Passage routes and in adjacent cells. Effects on violent crime are
almost immediate, with violent crime decreasing by 10% in the implementation year, 11%
in the first year after implementation, and 19% from the second year onward. For property
crime, the effect takes about a year to appear, but we see decreases in the second year of
implementation of around 7% and 10% from the third year on. These results suggest that
at least within three years we see no “deterrence decay” (Sherman, 1990, Sorg et al., 2013,
see) on the effects of the program.24
3.4.4 Robustness for Crime: Differential Trends
The identification of the effects of Safe Passage guards on crime depends on the assumption
that in the absence of guards crime would have evolved similarly in the treated and control
areas. Although we cannot test this assumption directly, in this section we provide evidence
that supports our it.
Descriptive evidence in Appendix Figure C.2, shows that the program was indeed imple-
mented in areas with higher crime incidents but there are no obvious differences in trends
before the program implementation. Control cells show no significant differences in levels
or trends after the program was implemented. Additionally we include in equation (1) an
indicator Safe Passage Cell ∗One year pre event which equals one for one year before the
area had a Safe Passage route. Similarly, we define Safe Passage Cell∗Two year pre event
for two years before the area had a Safe Passage route. The results are summarized in Table
3.7: none of the pre-event coefficients is significant, indicating absence of trend before the
24 We thank one of the referees for pointing us to this literature.
101
event. These results are consistent with our event study analysis presented in Figure 3.4,
and suggests that there is no systematic difference in trends between the treated and control
groups before the event.
As a robustness check, we also leverage the length of our crime data set and conduct a
placebo Safe Passage program in pre-program periods. By going back five, six or seven years
prior to the implementation of the program we can simulate the entire program without any
overlap with the actual start dates. Thus, for example, for five years prior, we define the
start of the program as 2004-2005 rather than the actual start in 2009-2010, with expansions
coming at the same intervals following 2004-2005 as those following the 2009-2010 start date.
The results, which are summarized in the Appendix Table C.7, show that Safe Passage routes
where effectively placed in high crime corridors, but the lack of decline in crime in these
placebo years suggest that the decline we see in our main results is in fact due to the Safe
Passage program. Taken together this evidence, these results suggest that our findings are
not caused by pre-trends.
3.4.5 Alternative Strategies: Different Control Groups
A potential concern with our spatial differences in differences strategy could be that our
control areas are slightly “farther away” from the school and may be fundamentally dissimilar
to areas near schools. To mitigate this concern, we show that our results are not sensitive
to the choice of control groups.
Our first approach is to identify control areas by using propensity score matching (Rosen-
baum and Rubin, 1985). We choose the two closest neighbors to the treated cell with com-
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mon support as controls. Our match is based on three broad categories: pre-program crime
counts, school characteristics of the school close to that cell, and census block group charac-
teristics.25 We match the neighboring schools to the cell and classify the schools as either in
the cell, one cell, or two cells adjacent. Including school and census block group character-
istics in the matching procedure ensures that the cells that are used as controls are similar
to the ones that received the treatment. Columns (2) and (5) in Table 3.8 summarize the
results when the control group is identified using propensity score matching.26 Under this
specification, we find results consistent with our earlier analysis, with violent crime declining
by 11.0%.27
A second alternative to matching is to use future Safe Passage route areas as controls
by exploiting the phased manner in which the program was rolled out. In this way our
control group comprises areas that receive the treatment in future. To exploit this variation,
we restrict the time period of the data to 2009-2010 through 2013-2014 school years. The
Safe Passage routes that received the treatment during this period are considered “treated”
routes, while the routes that received the treatment in the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 are used
as “controls”. Results under this alternative strategy remain consistent with the results
25For crime, we use the total number of violent and property crime in the cell during the period 2001-2008.
For school characteristics, we assign the average characteristics of the adjoining schools to the cell. We also
include school characteristics in identifying counterfactual cells, including the proportion of students eligible
for individualized education programs, the proportion receiving free lunches, the share of students who
are bilingual, and the percentage of African American, and percentage of Hispanic students. In addition
to the characteristics of the schools, we augment our data with census block group characteristics like
demographics, education, unemployment rate and housing characteristics coming from the 2009 - 2014 ACS
(5 year estimates). When a cell belongs to multiple census blocks, our algorithm assigns the cell to one of
the census blocks.
26Appendix Table C.8 summarizes the covariate balance for the matched sample. We also repeat this
exercise using the closest neighbor with no replacements and common support and find similar results.
27In Appendix Table C.9 we show that results hold when using alternative estimators as in Appendix
Table C.2.
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obtained earlier and are summarized in Table 3.8 in columns (3) and (6). Overall, the
evidence presented in this section assures us that the effects are driven by the presence of
guards and not by either pre-trends or the choice of our control groups.28
3.4.6 Heterogeneity in the Results for Crime
Our results show that the presence of the Safe Passage guards have on average a positive
impact of reducing crime in the guarded areas. In this section, we further explore these
results and show that our results are likely to be the result of Safe Passage guards deterring
and dispersing potential offenders from the guarded areas.
To begin, we analyze whether our estimated effects are confined to a reduction in crime
in schools in high crime neighborhoods. To analyze this differential effect, we classify areas
as high crime if they had above average crime for the three years before the program started
i.e. 2006-2008.29 The results are presented in Table 3.9. We do not find any differential effect
for violent crime across low and high crime neighborhoods. However, for property crime the
program leads to an additional (statistically significant) 6% reduction in high crime areas.
We also examine whether the program had great effects in neighborhoods with lower than
average crime. The first major expansion of the program (2009) was targeted at schools in the
most crime-ridden neighborhoods. It is also possible that the results are primarily associated
with the major expansion in 2013 as this expansion incorporated all the welcoming schools.
Thus, we test whether the estimated effects vary by major expansions of the program.30 Our
28We repeat the experiment for non-guarded times in Appendix Table C.10 and the point estimates suggest
that there is no effect in the guarded areas when the guards are not present.
29We based the calculations on monthly averages for census blocks containing Safe Passage routes.
30To focus on the three major expansions, we exclude all cells that were treated in other program years.
For instance, cells which serve as controls for the program year 2009-2010 but which get the Safe Passage
route in a later year are excluded from the analysis for 2009-2010.
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results presented in Table 3.10 show that there are similar effects of the program in all three
phases, with violent crimes declining by 12.5% to 15.4%. There also is suggestive evidence
of a decline in property crime but the point estimates are insignificant.
Having established that Safe Passage guards reduce crime, we now explore the mechanism
behind this reduction. We exploit the timing of the incidents and determine whether there
are differential effects within school-days. We divide the day into 2.5 hour bins - before guards
arrive, while they are present, and after they leave, in both the morning and afternoon. We




βh SafePassageCelli ∗ Postth (3.2)
+ θhOneCell Overi ∗ Postth + φh TwoCellsOveri ∗ Postth + γi + δth + uith
where #Crimesith is the number of incidents in cell i, in school year t, in time bin h. The
time bin indicates whether a crime takes place 2.5 hours before guards are present, while
they are present, or 2.5 hours after the guards have left. For example, SafePassageCelli
is an indicator for a cell on a Safe Passage Route, while Postth takes one for years following
the commencement of a route, with separate effects for times before, during, and after the
presences of guards. Thus, the coefficient βbefore captures the change in crime after the
program was implemented for times before guards are present, as compared to the control
area. The interpretation is similar for times during and after the presence of guards. To
complete the specification, we include controls for both cell and time of day-school year fixed
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effects.31 The time of day effects account for trends within the day by controlling for the
before, during and after times in both the morning and afternoon.
We plot the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the Safe Passage Cell coeffi-
cients in Figure 3.5. Panel (a) shows a clear pattern for violent crimes: estimated effects are
insignificant before guards arrive, but there is a statistically significant reduction in crime
while guards are present and also afterward. The significant effect after guards have left
suggests that guards may act as deterrent to those who might loiter in these areas after the
time when students are commuting to and from the schools. These findings are reinforced by
insignificant effects during non-school days when guards are never present. Property crimes
show a similar pattern in panel (b). However, there is some evidence of temporal displace-
ment of property crime, with some increase in the times when before guards are present.
None of the results for non-school days are significant.
These results suggest that Safe Passage guards are actually dispersing offenders, suggest-
ing that it may be dispersing students playing “hooky” that engage in crime. If this is true
we should see a higher impact of the Safe Passage guards on high schools. These results
are summarized in columns (4) and (8) of Table 3.9.32 We find that the overall reduction
in crime is primarily driven by high schools. Guarded areas around high schools witness an
additional 17% decrease in violent crimes and 11% reduction in property crimes. These gives
us some evidence that the reduction is driven by dispersing these juvenile offenders.
In Table 3.11 we explore these results by subcategory of crime and distinguishing again
31In this specification, we aggregate to the school year, as monthly/time of day aggregation would produce
a lot of zeros.
32There were a few middle schools which have been combined in the elementary school category, so the
elementary and middle schools serve as the base group.
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by type of school. Our results for violent crimes are driven by robbery whereas for property
crimes it is driven by aggravated battery, larceny and motor vehicle theft around high schools.
These are also the types of crime, which are committed by juveniles. According to NIBRS
data, among serious offenses, the most common crimes committed by juveniles are arson
(32.7%) of all offenses between 2012-2016), robbery (19.5%), motor vehicle theft (17.2%)
and burglary (16.7%). These results show that our results are driven by crimes around high
schools and by types of crimes that are more likely to be committed by juveniles.
3.4.7 Cost Benefit Analysis of the Program
In this section, we estimate the direct benefit of reductions in crime near the Safe Passage
schools. A starting point for this analysis involves estimating the potential benefits accrued
for the avoided crimes. The literature on the costs of crime suggests that the relevant
measure for policy analysis is the willingness to pay or an ex-ante measure of the costs of
crime (Ludwig 2010, Cohen et al. 2010, Cohen and Piquero 2009). The willingness to pay
approach quantifies how much people are willing to pay to reduce the likelihood of becoming
victims. A second approach for quantifying the costs of crime is to use the victim costs or
ex-post approach. These costs are often derived from civil jury awards, and capture both
direct costs such as injuries sustained during the incident and indirect costs such as pain and
suffering. We use Cohen and Piquero’s (2009) victim cost of crimes estimates, which is the
more conservative of the two estimates.33
The estimated effects for each crime subcategory are more imprecise and thus we conduct
a simulation exercise to account for the number of crimes that are potentially reduced. For
33Appendix Table C.11 column (1) and (2) shows these estimates in 2015 dollars
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each crime subcategory, we draw from a normal distribution with parameters described by
our estimates. With the pretreatment averages and cost for each type of crime, we obtain a
distribution of the benefits of the program shown in Figure 3.6.
Results from the simulation show that the mean benefit of the program based on willing-
ness to pay due to reduced crime is about $38.6 million per year, while the total cost of the
program is $17.8 million for the 2015-2016 school year. Simulations show that the probability
that the program’s benefits do not exceed its costs for the 2015-2016 school year is about
10%. We get much higher estimates when we use Cohen and Piquero’s (2009) willingness to
pay estimates.34
We should note at this point that our results are driven by the benefits associated with
reductions in the number of murders. We believe that it is important to include murder in
our estimates because the program would be considered a major success even if it save just
one life. The program was begun and subsequently expanded in large part because there
were concerns that students going to school might become murder victims. Chalfin and
McCrary (2017a) note that even after accounting for the rarity of murder, its expected cost
is 27 times higher than that of motor vehicle theft, with the latter being the most expensive
property crime.
Although a limitation of the analysis is that it does not take into account the general equi-
librium effects of the program, out simulation results strongly suggest that placing civilian
guards around schools is a relatively inexpensive way of significantly reducing crime.
34Using willingness to paste estimates our mean benefits are about $97.4 million. See Appendix Table
C.11 and Figure C.3.
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3.5 Do more eyes on the street reduce school absen-
teeism?
Our analysis shows that the presence of Safe Passage guards reduced violent crime without
displacing it to neighboring areas. If the program indeed is making school trips safer we
might expect to see immediate consequences on school attendance. In this section, we show
that this is indeed the case with the Safe Passage program.
3.5.1 Empirical Strategy
To explore the effects of the Safe Passage program on attendance we gather school level
data on attendance rates and other school level characteristics.35 Given the nonrandom as-
signment of the school program we use propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1985) to find suitable control schools. We match the schools based on three broad cate-
gories of variables: pre-program attendance, school characteristics, and Census block group
characteristics. We use attendance for the pre-treatment program years of 2006, 2007 and
2008. For school and Census block group characteristics, we use the same variables used in
constructing propensity score matches for crime.36 We use the propensity scores to identify
the two closest schools to a treated school in the range of common support. We then use a
difference in differences estimator of the form,
35School level data comes from the CPS website and includes school level attendance rates, demographic
information about the student body, proportion of student eligible for free lunch, proportion of bilingual
students, and overall attendance records.
36If any of these characteristics is missing for a school, we replace the missing data with the average value
for the sample.
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∆Attendanceit = βSafe Passage Schooli ∗ Postt + γi + δt + uit (3.3)
where ∆Attendanceit represents the annual change in attendance rate for school i in year
t. SafePassage Schooli equals one if school i has a Safe Passage program ever, Postt is an
indicator that takes one for the school years after the Safe Passage Program adoption. We
also include school fixed effects (γi) and year fixed effects (δt). Standard errors are clustered
at the school level. This identification strategy depends on the relative similarity of the
treated and control schools. Appendix Table C.12 summarizes the balance across covariates,
showing that there is no significant difference between the treated and the control sample.
3.5.2 Base Results for Attendance
Table 3.12 presents the estimates for the effect of the Safe Passage program on the change in
attendance.37 We find that schools in the Safe Passage program experience a 1.68 percentage
points increase in attendance (column (1)), which implies that attendance in the participating
schools increased at a faster rate than control schools not enrolled in the program.
A potential explanation for this result could be that the effect is due to the closing of some
schools and the reallocation of students to the Safe Passage schools designated as welcoming
schools. In column (2) we exclude welcoming schools from the sample. The estimated effects
after excluding the welcoming schools is stronger, with change in attendance being much
higher at 2.53 percentage points. When controlling for welcoming schools (column (3)),
37We also exclude the schools that had more than two years of missing attendance data in the Safe Passage
sample period. Results do not change significantly if we include these missing schools in our analysis.
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we see a decrease in their attendance.38 This result suggests that as new students coming
from the closed schools enrolled in the welcoming schools, the change in the composition of
students led to higher rates of absenteeism.39
Furthermore, since our results on crime show a larger effect for High Schools, we expect
a higher effect on attendance around High Schools. Column (4) shows that this is indeed
the case. Together, these results suggest that the program led to significant increases in
attendance rates as students felt safer while traveling to and from schools.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examine an alternative way of policing to increase student safety: hiring
civilians to serve as guards near schools for a few hours each day. To study this alternative
strategy, we focus on the Chicago Safe Passage program. The Safe Passage program began
with 35 schools in the 2009-2010 school year and has expanded to cover about 20% of Chicago
public schools in the 2015-2016 school year.
By combining detailed crime geo-located data with location of guards, we exploit the
timing of the start of the program and the location of the Safe Passage guards to estimate
their effect on crime. Our results show the Safe Passage program is an effective strategy
for reducing crime. Guarded schools experience a significant reduction in crime, especially
violent crime, with no crime displacement to adjacent areas. In addition, the effectiveness
38We estimate a similar model for enrollment and do find a significant rise in change in enrollment for the
welcoming schools, which provides evidence that the welcoming schools did absorb students from the schools
that had closed.
39The estimates using a difference-in-difference specification similar to that of crime are presented in the
Appendix Table C.13. Appendix Table C.14 presents results of estimating equation (3) by major expansions
of the program.
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of the program is not limited to the first year it is implemented but it continues to lower
crime throughout the implementation period. Schools that had the program for more than 2
school-years show a significant reduction in crime with an approximate 20% decline in violent
crime. The sharp reduction in violent crime is driven by the early adopters of the program.
Whereas, the reduction in property crime is explained by the two latter expansions.
The program provides an interesting insight of policies to increase safety. By placing
civilian guards, the reduction in crime is driven through deterrence rather than incapacita-
tion. One of the important questions for deterrence research is the “degree of correspondence
between actual and perceived risks” (Chalfin and McCrary, 2017b). The perceived risks are
more closely aligned to actual risk for the Safe Passage program as the program is well ad-
vertised, with signs clearly indicated that a route is being monitored during schools hours
along with the visible presence of the guards The guards are easily identifiable by their bright
neon jackets. The routes are also available on the on the City Data Portal, School websites,
and the CPS website.
We also find positive effect of the Safe Passage guards on attendance. Safe passage schools
increase their attendance rates by 2.5% on average when compared to other Chicago Public
Schools. Schools that received the program earlier where not only in more dangerous areas
but their attendance rate had dropped significantly. The presence of Safe Passage guards
not only made those areas safer but also contributed to significant increases in attendance
rates.
This improvement in attendance highlights the success of the program as it reflects that
students and their parents now have a sense of increased safety around the school that results
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in students attending school more regularly. The increase in attendance is driven by a safer
environment, and is likely to improve academic performance as earlier studies have shown
that higher attendance has a positive effect on math and reading scores. However, it should
be noted that our results show that crime incidents drop more in High Schools and that the
drop is not restricted only to the times the Safe Passage guards are on duty but also after
they leave. This suggests another potential explanation: High school students who otherwise
might loiter or be involved in criminal activities are not only deterred but also encouraged
to go to class. This would explain the reduction in crime after guards leave and the increase
in attendance.
Overall, our results suggest that placing civilian guards around schools is an inexpensive
and effective way of increasing safety and attendance. We evaluate the cost effectiveness of
the program in terms of crime avoided. We find that the Safe Passage program is a relatively
cheap way of increasing safety. We estimate that based on estimates for victim costs the
benefits of the program are around $38.6 million a year, whereas the estimated total cost
of the program was $17.8 million for the 2015-2016 school year. Although indirect benefits
- test scores, graduation rates, future job outcomes - are harder to measure and beyond
the scope of this reseach, they are likely to be considerable. Sickmund and Snyder (1999)
estimate that allowing a youth to leave high school for a life of crime and drug abuse results
in a cost to society of around $1.7 million - $2.3 million. Together, these estimates suggest
that the program’s direct benefits are substantial, and are much greater than the costs.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Safe Passage Program Rollout







Note: Data comes from Chicago Public Schools (CPS)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Average Number of Crimes and Demographic Descriptive Statistics of Chicago Block
Groups by the Presence of Schools and/or Safe Passages
CBGs CBGs CBGs
w/o Schools w. Schools with Diff. Diff.
and Safe Passages w/o Safe Passages Safe Passages
(a) (b) (c) (d)=(c)-(a) (e)=(c)-(b)
Violent Crimes 39.89 57.62 100.28 60.39*** 42.66***
(43.81) (50.40) (60.86) (4.42) (5.58)
Property Crimes 159.14 199.57 236.73 77.59*** 37.15**
(192.40) (172.48) (124.52) (18.59) (17.45)
Prop. of Whites 0.51 0.42 0.21 -0.3*** -0.22***
(0.35) (0.34) (0.29) (0.03) (0.04)
Prop. of Blacks 0.32 0.39 0.69 0.37*** 0.29***
(0.40) (0.42) (0.39) (0.04) (0.04)
Prop. of Female 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.01** 0.02**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
Median Age 36.18 34.91 33.46 -2.72*** -1.45*
(8.46) (8.20) (8.40) (0.83) (0.87)
Prop. with Incomplete HS 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.05*** 0.02
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.01) (0.01)
Median Income 53,671.68 47,909.20 34,260.25 -19,411.43*** -13,648.95***
(28,789.77) (26,085.67) (18,035.05) (2,778.21) (2,627.18)
Prop. Unemployed 0.14 0.16 0.25 0.11*** 0.09***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01)
Poverty Rate 0.20 0.23 0.33 0.13*** 0.1***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.01) (0.02)
Prop. on Food Stamps 0.20 0.24 0.38 0.19*** 0.14***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02)
Housing Units 477.35 464.74 413.36 -63.99** -51.38**
(277.65) (237.44) (206.20) (26.92) (24.61)
Prop. of Owners 0.50 0.47 0.37 -0.13*** -0.1***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (0.02) (0.03)
Prop. of Renters 0.50 0.53 0.63 0.13*** 0.1***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (0.02) (0.03)
Prop. of Vacant 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Median Number of Rooms 4.97 5.02 4.99 0.03 -0.03
(1.00) (0.86) (0.81) (0.10) (0.09)
Median Year of Construction 1949.81 1,948.30 1,946.78 -3.03** -1.52
(14.08) (14.53) (13.76) (1.38) (1.53)
Median Contract Rent 891.06 813.59 732.26 -158.8*** -81.33***
(299.97) (261.53) (203.08) (29.00) (26.69)
Median Gross Rent 1023.02 956.07 882.48 -140.53*** -73.58***
(295.87) (262.48) (235.82) (28.76) (27.35)
Median Property Value 242,785.41 230,345.44 176,533.36 -66,252.05*** -53,812.07***
(135,144.49) (131,430.85) (84,791.77) (13,041.92) (13,148.86)
Note: Columns (a)-(c) present the mean and standard deviation of each variable for Census Block Groups (CBG) without
Schools and Safe Passages (column (a)), with Schools but without Safe Passages (column (b)), and with Safe Passages (column
(c)). Columns (d)-(e) presents the difference of means. Violent Crimes represent the average monthly number of crimes between
2006 and 2008 over the census block groups. The total number of crimes is calculated as the sum of violent and property crimes.
Crime data come from the Chicago Data Portal, while the remaining variables come from 2009-2014 ACS.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Shapefiles with Safe Passage shape and location where obtained from the Chicago Data Portal and year that the
program was launched at each location through a FOIA request.
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Figure 3.2: Identification Strategy
Note: Figure shows the neighborhood map available to the public on the CPS website. We overlay Cells of one eight by one
eight mile (i.e. 1/64 of a square mile) that illustrates our identification strategy. Cells that are on a Safe Passage route are
designated as Safe Passage Cells. Cells directly adjacent to the Safe Passage Cells, are designated “One Cell Over”, cells that
are two cells from a Safe Passage Cell, are designated “Two Cells Over”.
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Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for estimating Equation (3.1) using dummy variables indicating proximity
to Safe Passage route. Safe Passage Cell*Post indicates the cell is in a Safe Passage route after the program was implemented
during week days when school is in session. One Cell Over*Post indicates that the cell is one cell adjacent to a Safe Passage
Cell after the program was implemented. Similarly, Two Cells Over*Post indicates that the cell is two cells adjacent to the
Safe Passage Cell. The omitted category is Three Cells Over * Post.
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Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for coefficients Safe Passage Cell*Post from estimating Equation (3.1)
using dummy variables indicating timing with respect to school year of adoption. The omitted category is the school year
prior to the implementation of the program.
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(d) Property Crimes on Non School Days
Note: Panels present estimates for Violent and Property Crimes and for School Days and Non School Days (where we
combine Summer and Weekends when guards are not present). Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for Difference in
Difference coefficients on time of day. “Before” denotes interaction between being a Safe Passage Cell after the program
implementation for 2.5 hours in morning and afternoon before guards arrive, “Guards are present” indicates 2.5 hours in
morning and afternoon during which guards are present, and “After” indicates 2.5 hours in morning and afternoon after the
guards have left.
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Figure 3.6: Cost Benefit Analysis
Note: The solid line is the density of possible benefits of the program, with a mean of $38.6 million. The red dotted line is the
cost ($17.8 million) for the Safe Passage program for the 2015-2016 school year. The distribution of the potential benefits of
the program is the result of a simulation exercise. We first draw 100,000 estimates of the program effect for each crime
category from a normal distribution with mean equal to the estimated coefficient and standard deviation equal to the
standard errors listed in columns (2) and (3) of Table C.11. Next, we calculate the benefits of the change in the number of
crimes using the pre-program mean and using Cohen and Piquero’s (2009) victim cost estimates (in 2015 dollars).
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.1: Transactions per year: Within 1/8mi. and 3/8mi. of a Park
Year Within 1/8mi. of a Park Within 3/8mi. of a Park Total
2, 001 11, 137 12, 681 23, 818
2, 002 10, 507 11, 495 22, 002
2, 003 10, 766 12, 906 23, 672
2, 004 15, 359 18, 281 33, 640
2, 005 17, 421 21, 186 38, 607
2, 006 27, 972 33, 739 61, 711
2, 007 22, 211 26, 200 48, 411
2, 008 16, 338 18, 946 35, 284
2, 009 12, 729 15, 485 28, 214
2, 010 15, 064 17, 952 33, 016
2, 011 12, 405 14, 089 26, 494
2, 012 13, 252 14, 759 28, 011
2, 013 16, 138 19, 089 35, 227
2, 014 15, 767 18, 479 34, 246
2, 015 16, 299 19, 253 35, 552
2, 016 9, 756 11, 945 21, 701
Notes: Sample includes transactions within 3/8 mi. of a park for Chicago (2001-2016),
New York (2006-2016), and Philadelphia (2006-2016) from Zillow.
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Table A.2: Park Premium and Neighborhood Homicide Risk: Base Results
Dependent variable:
ln Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Park 0.011 0.022∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Homicide Risk −0.005∗∗ −0.001 −0.002 −0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Park*Homicide Risk −0.013∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes No Yes No
Tract FE No No No Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 529,606 529,606 529,606 529,606
Notes: Sample includes transactions within 3/8 mi. of a park for Chicago (2001-2016), New
York (2006-2016), and Philadelphia (2006-2015) from Zillow. Dependent variable is log of
sales price, Park is an indicator for sales within 1/8 mi. of the park, Homicide Risk denotes
three year average number of homicides per squared mile in the neighborhood. Standard
errors clustered at the census tract level are in parenthesis
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Pred. Homicide Equiv. Risk 0.634∗∗∗
(0.013)
Property Char. Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Test of excluded Instruments
F-statistic 2479.657
P-value < 0
Week IV (Sanderson and Windmeijer, 2015)
F-statistic 130.508
Observations 430,453
Notes: The sample is the same as in Table 1.5. Homicide Equivalent Risk per squared
mi is instrumented using predicted Homicide Equivalent Risk per squared mile based
on the initial densities (first two years) and the total annual crimes at city level.
All regression include controls for dwelling characteristics, census tract demographic
controls, neighborhood and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the census
tract level are in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table A.4: Park Premium and Homicide Equivalent Risk: Shift-Share Instrument
Dependent variable:
ln Price
DD DD IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Park 0.008 0.022∗∗ 0.007 0.025∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Homicide Risk −0.017∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Park*Homicide Risk −0.006∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 430,453 430,453 430,453 430,453
Notes: Sample is the same as in Table 1.3 without the first two years of the sample for each
city, i.e. Chicago (2003-2016), New York (2008-2016), and Philadelphia (2008-2016). We use
the first two years to build the likelihood of homicides at each location. Dependent variable
is log of sales price, Park is an indicator for sales within 1/8 miles of the park, Homicide Risk
denotes number of expected crimes per squared mile in homicides equivalent terms. Columns
(1)-(2) present difference in difference estimates similar to those in 1.3, and columns (3)-(4)
instrumental variable estimates. Homicide Risk at a location is instrumented using predicted
expected homicides in that location based on the initial homicide density and the total annual
homicides at city level. All regression include controls for dwelling characteristics, census tract
demographic controls, neighborhood and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
census tract level are in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table A.5: Park Premium and Homicide Risk: Robustness
Dependent variable:
ln Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homicide Risk −0.015∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Park*Homicide Risk −0.0004 −0.006
(0.004) (0.009)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Park*Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 430,453 430,453 430,453 430,453
Notes: Sample is the same as in Table 1.3 without the first two years of the sample for each city,
i.e. Chicago (2003-2016), New York (2008-2016), and Philadelphia (2008-2016). We use the
first two years to build the likelihood of homicides at each location. Dependent variable is log of
sales price, Park is an indicator for sales within 1/8 miles of the park, Homicide Risk denotes
number of expected homicides per squared mile. Homicide Risk at a location is instrumented
using predicted expected homicides in that location based on the initial homicide density and
the total annual homicides at city level. Standard errors clustered at the census tract level are
in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table A.6: Park Premium and Homicide Risk:
Difference in Differences and Shift-Share Instrument. Excluding 2016
Dependent variable:
ln Price
DD DD IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Park 0.010 0.019∗∗ 0.009 0.023∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Homicide Risk −0.016∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Park*Homicide Risk −0.007∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 408,748 408,748 408,748 408,748
Notes: Sample is the same as in Table 1.3 without the first two years of the sample for each
city, i.e. Chicago (2003-2015), New York (2008-2015), and Philadelphia (2008-2015). We use
the first two years to build the likelihood of homicides at each location. Dependent variable
is log of sales price, Park is an indicator for sales within 1/8 miles of the park, Homicide
Risk denotes number of expected homicides per squared mile. Homicide Risk at a location is
instrumented using predicted expected homicides in that location based on the initial homicide
density and the total annual homicides at city level. Standard errors clustered at the census
tract level are in parenthesis.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Robustness
This section details a number of additional robustness checks. We explore the sensitivity of
our estimates to sample definitions, the use of alternative estimators, alternative geographic
time trends and using alternative definitions for access to video gambling. Overall, results
are similar across the different checks.
We explore the sensitivity of our results to alternative definitions of the sample. In
our main analysis we restrict our sample to census block groups that are ever within six
block groups from a video gambling establishment. In Table B.1, column (1) we present the
estimate for our preferred specification in the paper (column (5) of Table 2.1). In column
(2) we do not apply any restrictions in the sample and include all block groups in Chicago
while column (3) restricts to blocks within ten block groups of a gambling establishment. In
columns (4) and (5) we return to our original sample, but drop blocks on the lake shore or
those that are industrial (i.e., have no residences). Regardless of how we specify the sample,
our point estimates are very stable.
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The estimates are also very stable when using alternative estimators. In Table B.2 we
present estimates for our preferred specification using Poisson regression in the first column.
In column (2) we use Negative Binomial instead. In column (3) we redefine the dependent
variable as the logarithm of the number of crimes plus one and estimate by OLS. Again,
regardless of the estimator employed, results remain the same.
We also account for potential unobserved shocks such as community level policies or
changes in policing by accounting for different geographic trends. In our preferred specifi-
cation, we account for community area time trends. An alternative concern is that policing
strategies could have changed differently in different areas. To account for this potential,
instead of including community area trends, we include police district or beat-level trends in
columns (2) and (3) of Table B.4. Police are designated to a police district. Within district,
officers are equally assigned to different beats for the year. The point estimates remain very
similar to our original estimates. Additionally, column (4) uses census tract level trends,
which reduce our geographic variability substantially. Nevertheless, results are still robust
to accounting for time trends at this level.1
Our results do not depend on how access to video gambling is defined. We present
estimates using our preferred specification for a number of alternative definitions of access
to gambling in Table B.3. Number of VG Within 3 Blocks is the count of number of gambling
establishments within three block groups at time t, log(Volume Played+1 is the logarithm
of total volume played plus one at time t in all video gambling establishments within three
blocks. Access to VG is an access measure typically used in the trade literature that weights
1Chicago has 77 community areas, 23 police districts, 251 police beats, and 797 census tracts.
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each video gambling establishment by its distance (or travel time) at time t. For example, if
di,j is the linear distance (or traveling time) between block centroid i and establishment j, and
1(V Gj,t = 1) indicates that establishment j has video gambling in period t, then gambling
access (GA) is calculated as GAi,t =
∑J
j=1 exp(−1(V Gj,t = 1) · di,j). We standardize all the
measures to have mean zero and standard deviation one for ease of comparison. Regardless
of the definition used, results are very similar. For example, increasing the number of video
gambling establishments within 3 blocks by one standard deviation is associated with an
increase of 3.3% (s.e. 0.006) and 2.85% (s.e. 0.0097) in property and violent crimes.
When defining intensity of access to video gambling, in the paper we use volume played
at establishments within three blocks to show that effects were increasing in volume played.
Results are similar when using number of establishments within three blocks instead. Results
are presented in Figure B.1.
B.2 Effect on Supply of Bars
In the paper we show that accounting for the availability of bars either in the same block
or in neighboring blocks does not affect our estimates. Nevertheless, it is still valuable to
examine whether the Video Gaming Act affected the supply of bars in the area.
To examine whether the access to video gambling affected the number of bars within
Chicago, we replicate our analysis on crime but using number of bars as dependent variable
instead. We are interested in comparing areas inside Chicago that experienced higher access
to gambling with those that had relatively lower access to evaluate whether the number of
bars changed differentially. We show the evidence as an event-study figure in Figure B.2.a.
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Overall, we do not find evidence that access to gambling inside Chicago affected the number
of bars. Even though point estimates are positive after video gambling becomes accessible,
the magnitude is small and in the other direction. Using our baseline specification instead
of the event study, the estimated coefficient is 0.038 (s.e. 0.041).2 This is a small magnitude
considering that the average number of bars in the sample of block groups inside Chicago
used for the analysis is 1.42. Even if the effect were orders of magnitude larger, economically
it seems unlikely to be driving the effects on crime.
The larger threat to our interpretation of results is that the Video Gaming Act increased
the number of bars outside Chicago, near the border. To test this we employ a similar
analysis as before but now we include block group outside of Chicago that are within 3
blocks of the Chicago border. We define a new indicator variable that equals one if the
block has video gambling in that month, as a proxy for when the municipality allowed for
its implementation (blocks inside Chicago are always zero). The event-study estimates are
presented in Figure B.2.b. It seems that after video gambling was allowed, the number of
bars increased near the border outside of Chicago. However, notice that this trend was
already happening before the adoption of video gambling. For this reason, we should be
cautious about attributing the increase in number to video gambling. Taken together, the
evidence suggests that the effects of access to gambling on crime are not driven by changes
in access to bars. Next we explore potential mechanisms driving the relationship between
access to gambling and crime.
2Available in Table B.5.
150
B.3 Legalizing Video Gambling in Chicago
To explore the scenario where Chicago legalizes video gambling, we identify the potential
places that could have video gambling in the City from the liquor license data. We calculate
the expected change in crime by first excluding all census block groups that are already near
video gambling establishments located near the border.3 Using our main definition of access
(within three block groups), virtually all of Chicago’s block groups would fall within this
coverage area. Using average crime incidents for the last year in our data, we calculate the
expected monthly cost of legalizing video gambling in Chicago in Table 2.6.b. Legalizing
video gambling in Chicago can be expected to cost $5.4 million each month on average, with
a 90% confidence interval ranging from $1.7 to $9.3 million.
Legalizing video gambling would generate new tax revenue for Chicago. To estimate these
revenues we use video gambling establishments in Cook County that are located outside of
Chicago. Using the last year of our data, we select the optimistic scenario that establish-
ments in Chicago would generate tax revenues at the 90th percentile of establishments in
Cook County. This amounts to a monthly payout of $2,303 and $11,515 to the local and
state governments per establishment.4 Similar to before, we assume that the state trans-
fers the same proportion of revenues as the state income taxes (1.34%) to Chicago, so each
establishment would generate $2,457 each month. We use the average adoption rate across
the state (62%) to define estimate the proportion of bars and restaurants in Chicago that
3This is a overly conservative assumption because access would increase more as a result of legalizing
video gambling in Chicago. We found that effects are increasing with proximity, therefore these areas would
likely experience an additional increase in crime.
4With a 90% confidence interval of 2109; 2497 and 10544 ; 12487.
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would adopt video gambling. This would mean that 2170 establishments would generate tax
revenue from gambling for the city.5 Overall, we estimate that legalizing video gambling in
Chicago would generate an average of $5.3 million in tax revenues per month (90% confidence
interval between $4.88 and $5.78 million).
5At the time there were almost 3,500 bars and restaurants with liquor licenses in Chicago. The adoption
rate is based on matching zip code level data of liquor licenses and video gambling establishments for the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.2: Robustness to Estimator Used
(1) (2) (3)
(a) Property Crime
Nr. Property Crime log(Property+1)
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0667*** 0.0558*** 0.0351***
(0.0180) (0.00984) (0.0111)
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991
(b) Violent Crime
Nr. Violent Crime log(Violent+1)
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0753*** 0.0791*** 0.0405***
(0.0193) (0.0159) (0.00819)
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991
Estimator Poisson Neg. Binomial OLS
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups
from a video gambling establishment. Coefficients for estimating Equation (2.1) using
Poisson regression in column (1) and Negative Binomial in column (2). Column (3)
estimates the model using OLS, where the dependent variable is defined as the logarithm
of the number of crime incidents at time t plus one. Standard errors clustered at the
block group level are in parentheses. Within 3 blocks equals one if the census block
group is within 3 block groups of a video gambling establishment after the establishment
adopted video gambling. All estimates include block group fixed effects, month-year
effects, a quadratic function of distance to the closest riverboat casino, community area-
time trends, and demographic controls obtained by extrapolating between the Census
and American Community Survey: total population, population density, median age,
average household size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African
Americans, number of housing units, percentage of vacant housing, and percentage of
home owners.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table B.3: Alternative Video Gambling Access Definitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Property Crime
Number of VG Within 3 Blocks 0.0330***
(0.00602)
log(Volume Played +1) 0.0254***
(0.00606)
Access to VG (linear distance) 0.0178***
(0.00658)
Access to VG (travel time) 0.0145***
(0.00480)
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991
(b) Violent Crime
Number of VG Within 3 Blocks 0.0285***
(0.00966)
log(Volume Played +1) 0.0269***
(0.00639)
Access to VG (linear distance) 0.0279***
(0.00746)
Access to VG (travel time) 0.0216***
(0.00523)
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video
gambling establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Each coeffi-
cient is an estimate of Equation (2.1) using Poisson regression. Standard errors clustered at the block
group level are in parentheses. All measures of access are standardized with mean zero and standard
deviation of one (see Section B.1 for variable definitions). All estimates include block group fixed
effects, month-year effects, a quadratic function of distance to the closest riverboat casino, commu-
nity area-time trends, and demographic controls obtained by extrapolating between the Census and
American Community Survey: total population, population density, median age, average household
size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage of African Americans, number of housing units,
percentage of vacant housing, and percentage of home owners.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table B.4: Robustness to alternative trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Property Crime
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0667*** 0.0498*** 0.0498*** 0.0491**
(0.0180) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0198)
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991
(b) Violent Crime
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0753*** 0.0736*** 0.0533*** 0.0509**
(0.0193) (0.0186) (0.0204) (0.0226)
Observations 125,857 125,857 125,857 125,857
Number of blocks 991 991 991 991
Linear Time Trends Community Area Police District Police Beat Census Tract
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video gambling
establishment. Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Coefficients for estimating
model 2.1 using Poisson regression. Within 3 blocks equals one if the census block group is within 3 block
groups of a video gambling establishment after the establishment adopted video gambling. Each column
uses different level-specific linear time trend (e.g., Community, Police District, etc.). All estimates include
block group fixed effects, month-year effects, a quadratic function of distance to the closest riverboat casino,
and demographic controls from the Census and American Community Survey (see Section 2.4 for full list of
controls). Standard errors clustered at the block group level are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table B.5: Effect of Video Gambling Act on Number of Bars
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Bars
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 0.0379 0.0485
(0.0407) (0.0388)
Block has VG (=1) 0.105*** 0.110***
(0.0386) (0.0387)
Observations 26,001 44,874 44,874
Number of blocks 312 554 554
Original Sample Yes No No
Expanded Sample No Yes Yes
Notes: Each coefficient is an estimate of Equation (2.1) using Pois-
son regression. Standard errors clustered at the block group level
are in parentheses. Within 3 blocks equals one if the census block
group is within 3 block groups of a video gambling establishment af-
ter the establishment adopted video gambling. Column (1) restricts
the sample to block groups in Chicago. Columns (2) and (3) include
Chicago and block groups outside of Chicago that are within three
block groups from the Chicago border. Block has VG equals one if
the block group has at least one establishment with video gambling
at time t. All estimates include block group fixed effects, month-
year effects, a quadratic function of distance to the closest riverboat
casino, community area-time trends, and demographic controls ob-
tained by extrapolating between the Census and American Commu-
nity Survey: total population, population density, median age, aver-
age household size, percentage males between 15 and 35, percentage
of African Americans, number of housing units, percentage of vacant
housing, and percentage of home owners.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant
at 1% level.
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Table B.6: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
(a) Crime counts
Property 125,857 3.728 3.772 0 75
Violent 125,857 1.194 1.662 0 17
Domestic 125,857 2.037 2.342 0 22
Arson 125,857 0.024 0.162 0 5
Burglary 125,857 0.845 1.225 0 17
Larceny 125,857 2.235 2.881 0 71
Motor Vehicle Theft 125,857 0.625 0.972 0 15
Robbery 125,857 0.518 0.941 0 14
Homicide 125,857 0.022 0.156 0 6
Sexual Assault 125,857 0.058 0.248 0 4
Aggravated Assault 125,857 0.228 0.532 0 7
Aggravated Battery 125,857 0.368 0.751 0 10
(b) Access to video gambling
Within 3 Blocks (=1) 125,857 0.116 0.320 0 1
(c) Access to bars
Same Block (/100) 98,109 0.005 0.010 0 0.13
Within 3 Blocks (/100) 98,109 0.134 0.248 0 2.35
(d) 2011-2015 ACS characteristics
Population 991 1248.299 569.105 0 8572
Pop. Density 991 14756.800 9171.606 0 55074.66
Median Age 991 36.119 8.474 0 76.4
Avg. HH Size 991 3.087 0.647 0 5.72
Nr. Housing Units 991 461.134 178.503 0 1487
% Male between 15-35 991 0.137 0.059 0 0.52
% Black 991 0.395 0.429 0 1
% Vacant 991 0.128 0.104 0 0.77
% Owner inhabited 991 0.505 0.253 0 1
Notes: Data in panels (a) to (c) at the census block group by month level for the sample
of block groups in Chicago ever within six block groups of a video gambling establishment,
used for our main analysis. Panel (d) from the 2011-2015 American Community Survey at
the block group level for the same sample.
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Number of Establishments with Video Gambling Within 3 Blocks
Coefficient 95% CI
(b) Violent Crimes
Notes: Sample of Chicago census block groups by month ever within six block groups from a video gambling establishment.
Dependent variables are number of property or violent crimes. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for estimating
Equation (2.1) using dummy variables by number of video gambling establishments within three blocks. Classified into
four groups by quartile of number of establishments. The omitted category is zero establishments.
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Months with respect to video gambling establishment opening within 3 blocks
Coefficient 95% CI
(b) Outside Chicago (comparing to inside Chicago)
Notes: Sample of census block groups by month (a) ever within six block groups from a video gambling establishment;
(b) adding within three blocks of Chicago border, outside of Chicago. Dependent variables are number of bars. Point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals for estimating Equation (2.1) using dummy variables indicating timing with respect
to first video gambling establishment operating within three blocks. The omitted category is 6 to 1 months before video
gambling establishment operates within three blocks (-6/-1).
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Appendix C


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.2: Effect of the Safe Passage Program on Crime, Robustness to Estimator Used
Number of Violent Crimes
Poisson Neg. Binomial OLS OLS-Population OLS-Traffic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Safe Passage Cell*Post -0.1410*** -0.1400*** -0.0433*** -0.0034*** -0.0037***
(0.0370) (0.0303) (0.0049) (0.0007) (0.0006)
One Cell Over*Post 0.0062 0.0062 -0.0059** -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0294) (0.0264) (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Two Cells Over*Post 0.0029 0.003 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0268) (0.0243) (0.0020) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 508,376 508,376 603,034 596,356 600,914
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month - Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Property Crimes
Poisson Neg. Binomial OLS OLS-Population OLS-Traffic
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Safe Passage Cell*Post -0.0277 -0.0181 -0.0659*** -0.0037** -0.0055***
(0.0262) (0.0206) (0.0126) (0.0016) (0.0015)
One Cell Over*Post 0.0158 0.0126 -0.0058 0.0021** 0.0008
(0.0231) (0.0171) (0.0084) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Two Cells Over*Post 0.0084 0.0096 0.0073 0.0013 0.0023***
(0.0187) (0.0154) (0.0061) (0.0010) (0.0007)
Observations 552,896 552,896 603,034 596,356 600,914
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month - Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The specification is similar to Table 3.4 columns (3) and (6). Each column corresponds to a particular estimator
referred in the heading. Columns (1) and (6) repeat Table 4 columns (3) and (6). Columns (2) and (7) use Negative
Binomial. Columns (3) and (8) OLS regression. Dependent variable in these cases is the count of crimes per cell (one
eighth by one eighth of a mile) per month when schools are in session for the period January 2006 to August 2016.
Columns (4), (5), (9) and (10) show OLS results when the dependent variable are rates, in columns (4) and (9) rates
are calculated as incidents per population in each cell, and in columns (5) and (10) the rates are calculated using traffic
estimates for the streets in the cell.
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table C.3: Effect of the Safe Passage Program on Crime, Alternative Trends
Number of Violent Crimes
Base Community Census Safe Police Police
Area Tract Passage District Beats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Safe Passage Cell*Post -0.1410*** -0.1446*** -0.1001** -0.1378*** -0.1616*** -0.1328***
(0.0370) (0.0368) (0.0398) (0.0374) (0.0366) (0.0247)
One Cell Over*Post 0.0062 -0.0025 0.0215 0.0015 -0.0136 -0.004
(0.0294) (0.0297) (0.0292) (0.0301) (0.0297) (0.0223)
Two Cells Over*Post 0.0029 -0.0033 0.0049 0.0007 -0.0075 0.0053
(0.0268) (0.0261) (0.0277) (0.0261) (0.0266) (0.0217)
Observations 508,376 508,376 508,376 508,376 508,376 508,376
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month - Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Property Crimes
Base Community Census Safe Police Police
Area Tract Passage District Beats
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Safe Passage Cell*Post -0.0277 -0.002 0.0048 0.0035 -0.0091 -0.0016
(0.0262) (0.0269) (0.0278) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0131)
One Cell Over*Post 0.0158 0.0354 0.0386** 0.0369 0.0303 0.0347
(0.0231) (0.0228) (0.0213) (0.0229) (0.0234) (0.0112)
Two Cells Over*Post 0.0084 0.0186 0.0175 0.0213 0.0161 0.0225
(0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0177) (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0107)
Observations 552,896 552,896 552,896 552,896 552,896 552,896
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month - Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each column repeats Table 3.4 columns (3) and (6) and add controls for different geographic areas specific time trends
referred to in the heading, except for Columns (1) and (7).
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table C.4: Number of Police Officers by Safe Passage
Log of Number of Police Officers
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Safe Passages in District -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 2,040 2,040 2,040
Police District FE Yes Yes Yes
Month - Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Columns show coefficient and standard errors (in parenthesis) from an equation of
log number of sworn Chicago police personnel by police district and by month between
January 2008 to September 2016 on the number of Safe Passages in the police district.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.8: Crime: Covariate Balance for Matching with 2 closest neighbors
Mean t-test
Treated Control %bias t p > t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Crime Count (Violent & Property)
Crime Count (2006) 72.558 71.352 2.3 0.38 0.706
Crime Count (2007) 69.367 69.233 0.3 0.04 0.965
Crime Count (2008) 64.616 64.199 0.8 0.14 0.887
School Characteristics: Proportion of Students
Eligible for free lunch 0.93093 0.93212 -0.7 -0.36 0.721
Hispanic 21.286 20.29 3.1 0.7 0.487
Census Block Characteristics
Share Black 0.71265 0.72352 -2.8 -0.64 0.519
Proportion below high school 0.22222 0.22214 0.1 0.01 0.988
Median Family Income 33861 33947 -0.4 -0.1 0.917
Unemployment Rate 0.2365 0.23731 -0.7 -0.14 0.891
Poverty Rate 0.32372 0.32387 -0.1 -0.02 0.982
Owner occupancy Rate 0.38467 0.38315 0.6 0.15 0.881
Vacancy Rate 0.20213 0.20459 -2.1 -0.45 0.656
Median Home Value 1.70E+05 1.70E+05 0.1 0.03 0.976
Median Gross Rent 900.41 912.27 -4.4 -1.08 0.281
No. of schools in that area∗ 4.254 4.2213 1.7 0.33 0.74
Note: The table compares the mean of the treated and control for the matched sample obtained by propensity score
matching using the two closest neighbors.
∗Number of schools that are in that cell, one block, two block or three blocks adjacent
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Table C.9: Effect of the Safe Passage Program on Crime:
Robustness to Estimators using Matching
Number of Violent Crimes
Poisson Neg. Binomial OLS OLS-Population OLS-Traffic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Safe Passage Cell*Post -0.1128*** -0.1149*** -0.0336*** -0.0027*** -0.0031***
(0.0279) (0.0309) (0.0047) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Observations 167,162 167,162 177,868 177,126 177,868
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month - Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Property Crimes
Poisson Neg. Binomial OLS OLS-Population OLS-Traffic
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Safe Passage Cell*Post -0.0227 -0.0165 -0.0399*** -0.0036*** -0.0047***
(0.0181) (0.0163) (0.0107) (0.0014) (0.0012)
Observations 172,250 172,250 177,868 177,126 177,868
Cell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month - Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table presents a similar exercise as Appendix Table C.2 with control groups were obtained using matching
estimators presented in Table 3.8.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.12: Attendance: Covariate Balance for Matching with 2 closest neighbors
Mean t-test
Treated Control %bias t p > t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. of Enrollments
Enrollment in 2008 88.217 89.457 -15 -1.02 0.308
School characteristics: Proportion of Students
Eligible for Free Lunch 0.93908 0.93511 2.5 0.41 0.685
Hispanic 22.217 23.577 -3.9 -0.34 0.73
Census Block Group Characteristics
Share Black 0.68126 0.67313 2 0.17 0.864
Proportion below High School 0.20957 0.23742 -20.2 -1.74 0.083
Median Family Income 35455 30960 19.7 1.89 0.06
Unemployment Rate 0.24339 0.25928 -13.2 -0.93 0.352
Poverty Rate 0.31763 0.35943 -26.9 -2.03 0.043
Owner Occupancy Rate 0.38232 0.3387 18.7 1.54 0.124
Vacancy Rate 0.19331 0.20754 -12.7 -0.95 0.344
Median Home Value 1.80E+05 1.70E+05 6.8 0.58 0.56
Median Gross Rent 900.45 852.84 19.3 1.6 0.11
Note: The table compares the mean of the treated and control for the matched sample obtained by propensity score
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.1: Safe Passages: By Starting Program Year
Program Year
2009−2010
(a) 2009-2010 School Year
Program Year
2012−2013
(b) 2012-2013 School Year
Program Year
2013−2014
(c) 2013-2014 School Year
Program Year
2014−2015
(d) 2014-2015 School Year
Program Year
2015−2016







(f) All Safe Passages
Note:
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Figure C.2: Violent and Property Crime trends






































































































































































Note: Note: The Figure presents the average number of (C.2a) violent and (C.2b) property crimes when schools are in session
(daytimes for week days of the school year). We distinguish by Safe Passage Cells, our treated cells, with our control cells,
One Cell Over, Two Cells Over, and Three Cells Over. The vertical dotted line marks the start of the program. Given the
phased way the program was implemented, we normalize to a common start and show the averages for the four pre-program
years and for three post-program years
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Figure C.3: Cost Benefit Analysis,
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Note: The dotted line is the density of possible benefits of the program using victim cost estimates, with a mean of $38.6
million. The solid line denotes the density for possible benefits using willingness to pay estimate, which has a mean of $97.4
million. The red dotted line is the cost ($17.8 million) for the Safe Passage program for the 2015-2016 school year. The
distribution of the potential benefits of the program is the result of a simulation exercise. First, we draw 100,000 estimates of
the program effect for each crime category from normal distribution with mean equal to the estimated coefficient and
standard deviation equal to the standard errors listed in Table C.11 columns (2) and (3). Then we calculate the benefits of
the program by using the preprogram mean and (2009) cost estimates (in 2015 dollars).
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